linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v7 1/8] fs: introduce kernel_pread

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Message-ID: <1591622526.4638.71.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date:   Mon, 08 Jun 2020 09:22:06 -0400
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
Cc:     Scott Branden <scott.branden@...adcom.com>,
        Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
        Wolfram Sang <wsa@...nel.org>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        David Brown <david.brown@...aro.org>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, bjorn.andersson@...aro.org,
        Shuah Khan <skhan@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        "Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-msm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        BCM Kernel Feedback <bcm-kernel-feedback-list@...adcom.com>,
        Olof Johansson <olof@...om.net>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>,
        Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Takashi Iwai <tiwai@...e.de>, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
        Andy Gross <agross@...nel.org>,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 1/8] fs: introduce kernel_pread_file* support

On Mon, 2020-06-08 at 06:16 -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 08, 2020 at 09:03:21AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Sat, 2020-06-06 at 08:52 -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> > > On Fri, Jun 05, 2020 at 10:04:51PM -0700, Scott Branden wrote:
> > > > -int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
> > > > -		     loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> > > > -{
> > > > -	loff_t i_size, pos;
> > > > +int kernel_pread_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
> > > > +		      loff_t pos, loff_t max_size,
> > > > +		      enum kernel_pread_opt opt,
> > > > +		      enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> > > > +{
> > > > +	loff_t alloc_size;
> > > > +	loff_t buf_pos;
> > > > +	loff_t read_end;
> > > > +	loff_t i_size;
> > > >  	ssize_t bytes = 0;
> > > >  	int ret;
> > > >  
> > > 
> > > Look, it's not your fault, but this is a great example of how we end
> > > up with atrocious interfaces.  Someone comes along and implements a
> > > simple DWIM interface that solves their problem.  Then somebody else
> > > adds a slight variant that solves their problem, and so on and so on,
> > > and we end up with this bonkers API where the arguments literally change
> > > meaning depending on other arguments.
> > > 
> > > > @@ -950,21 +955,31 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
> > > >  		ret = -EINVAL;
> > > >  		goto out;
> > > >  	}
> > > > -	if (i_size > SIZE_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
> > > > +
> > > > +	/* Default read to end of file */
> > > > +	read_end = i_size;
> > > > +
> > > > +	/* Allow reading partial portion of file */
> > > > +	if ((opt == KERNEL_PREAD_PART) &&
> > > > +	    (i_size > (pos + max_size)))
> > > > +		read_end = pos + max_size;
> > > > +
> > > > +	alloc_size = read_end - pos;
> > > > +	if (i_size > SIZE_MAX || (max_size > 0 && alloc_size > max_size)) {
> > > >  		ret = -EFBIG;
> > > >  		goto out;
> > > 
> > > ... like that.
> > > 
> > > I think what we actually want is:
> > > 
> > > ssize_t vmap_file_range(struct file *, loff_t start, loff_t end, void **bufp);
> > > void vunmap_file_range(struct file *, void *buf);
> > > 
> > > If end > i_size, limit the allocation to i_size.  Returns the number
> > > of bytes allocated, or a negative errno.  Writes the pointer allocated
> > > to *bufp.  Internally, it should use the page cache to read in the pages
> > > (taking appropriate reference counts).  Then it maps them using vmap()
> > > instead of copying them to a private vmalloc() array.
> > > 
> > > kernel_read_file() can be converted to use this API.  The users will
> > > need to be changed to call kernel_read_end(struct file *file, void *buf)
> > > instead of vfree() so it can call allow_write_access() for them.
> > > 
> > > vmap_file_range() has a lot of potential uses.  I'm surprised we don't
> > > have it already, to be honest.
> > 
> > Prior to kernel_read_file() the same or verify similar code existed in
> > multiple places in the kernel.  The kernel_read_file() API
> > consolidated the existing code adding the pre and post security hooks.
> > 
> > With this new design of not using a private vmalloc, will the file
> > data be accessible prior to the post security hooks?  From an IMA
> > perspective, the hooks are used for measuring and/or verifying the
> > integrity of the file.
> 
> File data is already accessible prior to the post security hooks.
> Look how kernel_read_file works:
> 
>         ret = deny_write_access(file);
>         ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id);
>                 *buf = vmalloc(i_size);
>                 bytes = kernel_read(file, *buf + pos, i_size - pos, &pos);
>         ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id);
> 
> kernel_read() will read the data into the page cache and then copy it
> into the vmalloc'd buffer.  There's nothing here to prevent read accesses
> to the file.

The post security hook needs to access to the file data in order to
calculate the file hash.  The question is whether prior to returning
from kernel_read_file() the caller can access the file data.

Mimi