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Date:   Tue, 9 Jun 2020 09:51:07 -0700
From:   Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
To:     Daeho Jeong <daeho43@...il.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-f2fs-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net, kernel-team@...roid.com,
        Daeho Jeong <daehojeong@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH] f2fs: add F2FS_IOC_SEC_TRIM_FILE ioctl

On Tue, Jun 09, 2020 at 03:01:37PM +0900, Daeho Jeong wrote:
> From: Daeho Jeong <daehojeong@...gle.com>
> 
> Added a new ioctl to send discard commands or/and zero out
> to whole data area of a regular file for security reason.

With this ioctl available, what is the exact procedure to write and then later
securely erase a file on f2fs?  In particular, how can the user prevent f2fs
from making multiple copies of file data blocks as part of garbage collection?

> +static int f2fs_secure_erase(struct block_device *bdev, block_t block,
> +					block_t len, u32 flags)
> +{
> +	struct request_queue *q = bdev_get_queue(bdev);
> +	sector_t sector = SECTOR_FROM_BLOCK(block);
> +	sector_t nr_sects = SECTOR_FROM_BLOCK(len);
> +	int ret = 0;
> +
> +	if (!q)
> +		return -ENXIO;

Why can the request_queue be NULL here?

> +
> +	if (flags & F2FS_TRIM_FILE_DISCARD)
> +		ret = blkdev_issue_discard(bdev, sector, nr_sects, GFP_NOFS,
> +						blk_queue_secure_erase(q) ?
> +						BLKDEV_DISCARD_SECURE : 0);
> +
> +	if (!ret && flags & F2FS_TRIM_FILE_ZEROOUT)
> +		ret = blkdev_issue_zeroout(bdev, sector, nr_sects, GFP_NOFS, 0);
> +
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int f2fs_sec_trim_file(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)
> +{
> +	struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
> +	struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
> +	struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
> +	struct block_device *prev_bdev = NULL;
> +	loff_t file_size;
> +	pgoff_t index, pg_start = 0, pg_end;
> +	block_t prev_block = 0, len = 0;
> +	u32 flags;
> +	int ret = 0;
> +
> +	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || f2fs_is_atomic_file(inode) ||
> +			f2fs_compressed_file(inode))
> +		return -EINVAL;

Is it valid to check f2fs_is_atomic_file() and f2fs_compressed_file() outside of
inode_lock()?

> +
> +	if (f2fs_readonly(sbi->sb))
> +		return -EROFS;

Isn't this redundant with mnt_want_write_file()?

Also, shouldn't write access to the file be required, i.e.
(filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)?  Then the f2fs_readonly() and
mnt_want_write_file() checks would be unnecessary.

> +
> +	if (f2fs_lfs_mode(sbi))
> +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;

Doesn't this check have to be serialized with remount?

> +
> +	if (get_user(flags, (u32 __user *)arg))
> +		return -EFAULT;
> +	if (!(flags & F2FS_TRIM_FILE_MASK))
> +		return -EINVAL;

Need to reject unknown flags:

	if (flags & ~F2FS_TRIM_FILE_MASK)
		return -EINVAL;

> +
> +	if (flags & F2FS_TRIM_FILE_DISCARD && !f2fs_hw_support_discard(sbi))
> +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> +	ret = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
> +	if (ret)
> +		return ret;
> +
> +	inode_lock(inode);
> +
> +	file_size = i_size_read(inode);
> +	if (!file_size)
> +		goto err;

->i_size is stable while holding inode_lock().  So just use ->i_size instead of
i_size_read().

> +	pg_end = (pgoff_t)round_up(file_size, PAGE_SIZE) >> PAGE_SHIFT;

This can be simplified to:

	pg_end = DIV_ROUND_UP(file_size, PAGE_SIZE);


- Eric

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