[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20200609184517.GL134822@grain>
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2020 21:45:17 +0300
From: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>
To: Adrian Reber <areber@...hat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <ovzxemul@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@...il.com>,
Andrei Vagin <avagin@...il.com>,
Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@...sigma.com>,
Michał Cłapiński <mclapinski@...gle.com>,
Kamil Yurtsever <kyurtsever@...gle.com>,
Dirk Petersen <dipeit@...il.com>,
Christine Flood <chf@...hat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
Radostin Stoyanov <rstoyanov1@...il.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
On Wed, Jun 03, 2020 at 06:23:26PM +0200, Adrian Reber wrote:
> This patch introduces CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, a new capability facilitating
> checkpoint/restore for non-root users.
>
> Over the last years, The CRIU (Checkpoint/Restore In Userspace) team has been
> asked numerous times if it is possible to checkpoint/restore a process as
> non-root. The answer usually was: 'almost'.
>
> The main blocker to restore a process as non-root was to control the PID of the
> restored process. This feature available via the clone3 system call, or via
> /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid is unfortunately guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
...
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index d86c0afc8a85..ce02f3a4b2d7 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2189,16 +2189,16 @@ struct map_files_info {
> };
>
> /*
> - * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN to follow the links, due to concerns about how the
> - * symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on ancestor directories in the
> - * path to the file in question.
> + * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to follow the links, due
> + * to concerns about how the symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on
> + * ancestor directories in the path to the file in question.
> */
> static const char *
> proc_map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
> struct inode *inode,
> struct delayed_call *done)
> {
> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (!(capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)))
> return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
First of all -- sorry for late reply. You know, looking into this code more
I think this CAP_SYS_ADMIN is simply wrong: for example I can't even fetch
links for /proc/self/map_files. Still /proc/$pid/maps (which as well points
to the files opened) test for ptrace-read permission. I think we need
ptrace-may-attach test here instead of these capabilities (if I can attach
to a process I can read any data needed, including the content of the
mapped files, if only I'm not missing something obvious).
Powered by blists - more mailing lists