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Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2020 09:20:17 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: lwn@....net, jslaby@...e.cz,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Linux 5.7.2
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
index 2e0e3b45d02a..b39531a3c5bc 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -492,6 +492,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
Date: January 2018
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
index 0795e3c2643f..ca4dbdd9016d 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -14,3 +14,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
mds
tsx_async_abort
multihit.rst
+ special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..47b1b3afac99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+SRBDS - Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+=============================================
+
+SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows MDS :doc:`mds` techniques to
+infer values returned from special register accesses. Special register
+accesses are accesses to off core registers. According to Intel's evaluation,
+the special register reads that have a security expectation of privacy are
+RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY.
+
+When RDRAND, RDSEED and EGETKEY instructions are used, the data is moved
+to the core through the special register mechanism that is susceptible
+to MDS attacks.
+
+Affected processors
+--------------------
+Core models (desktop, mobile, Xeon-E3) that implement RDRAND and/or RDSEED may
+be affected.
+
+A processor is affected by SRBDS if its Family_Model and stepping is
+in the following list, with the exception of the listed processors
+exporting MDS_NO while Intel TSX is available yet not enabled. The
+latter class of processors are only affected when Intel TSX is enabled
+by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise they are not affected.
+
+ ============= ============ ========
+ common name Family_Model Stepping
+ ============= ============ ========
+ IvyBridge 06_3AH All
+
+ Haswell 06_3CH All
+ Haswell_L 06_45H All
+ Haswell_G 06_46H All
+
+ Broadwell_G 06_47H All
+ Broadwell 06_3DH All
+
+ Skylake_L 06_4EH All
+ Skylake 06_5EH All
+
+ Kabylake_L 06_8EH <= 0xC
+ Kabylake 06_9EH <= 0xD
+ ============= ============ ========
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this SRBDS issue:
+
+ ============== ===== =====================================
+ CVE-2020-0543 SRBDS Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+ ============== ===== =====================================
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+An unprivileged user can extract values returned from RDRAND and RDSEED
+executed on another core or sibling thread using MDS techniques.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------
+Intel will release microcode updates that modify the RDRAND, RDSEED, and
+EGETKEY instructions to overwrite secret special register data in the shared
+staging buffer before the secret data can be accessed by another logical
+processor.
+
+During execution of the RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions, off-core
+accesses from other logical processors will be delayed until the special
+register read is complete and the secret data in the shared staging buffer is
+overwritten.
+
+This has three effects on performance:
+
+#. RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions have higher latency.
+
+#. Executing RDRAND at the same time on multiple logical processors will be
+ serialized, resulting in an overall reduction in the maximum RDRAND
+ bandwidth.
+
+#. Executing RDRAND, RDSEED or EGETKEY will delay memory accesses from other
+ logical processors that miss their core caches, with an impact similar to
+ legacy locked cache-line-split accesses.
+
+The microcode updates provide an opt-out mechanism (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to disable
+the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions executed outside of Intel
+Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) enclaves. On logical processors that
+disable the mitigation using this opt-out mechanism, RDRAND and RDSEED do not
+take longer to execute and do not impact performance of sibling logical
+processors memory accesses. The opt-out mechanism does not affect Intel SGX
+enclaves (including execution of RDRAND or RDSEED inside an enclave, as well
+as EGETKEY execution).
+
+IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR Definition
+--------------------------------
+Along with the mitigation for this issue, Intel added a new thread-scope
+IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR, (address 0x123). The presence of this MSR and
+RNGDS_MITG_DIS (bit 0) is enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0).EDX[SRBDS_CTRL =
+9]==1. This MSR is introduced through the microcode update.
+
+Setting IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[0] (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to 1 for a logical processor
+disables the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED executed outside of an Intel SGX
+enclave on that logical processor. Opting out of the mitigation for a
+particular logical processor does not affect the RDRAND and RDSEED mitigations
+for other logical processors.
+
+Note that inside of an Intel SGX enclave, the mitigation is applied regardless
+of the value of RNGDS_MITG_DS.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The kernel command line allows control over the SRBDS mitigation at boot time
+with the option "srbds=". The option for this is:
+
+ ============= =============================================================
+ off This option disables SRBDS mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED on
+ affected platforms.
+ ============= =============================================================
+
+SRBDS System Information
+-----------------------
+The Linux kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For
+SRBDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
+
+The possible values contained in this file are:
+
+ ============================== =============================================
+ Not affected Processor not vulnerable
+ Vulnerable Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled
+ Vulnerable: No microcode Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
+ mitigation
+ Mitigation: Microcode Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+ effect.
+ Mitigation: TSX disabled Processor is only vulnerable when TSX is
+ enabled while this system was booted with TSX
+ disabled.
+ Unknown: Dependent on
+ hypervisor status Running on virtual guest processor that is
+ affected but with no way to know if host
+ processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
+ ============================== =============================================
+
+SRBDS Default mitigation
+------------------------
+This new microcode serializes processor access during execution of RDRAND,
+RDSEED ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for
+reuse. Use the "srbds=off" kernel command line to disable the mitigation for
+RDRAND and RDSEED.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 7bc83f3d9bdf..5e2ce88d6eda 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4757,6 +4757,26 @@
the kernel will oops in either "warn" or "fatal"
mode.
+ srbds= [X86,INTEL]
+ Control the Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+ (SRBDS) mitigation.
+
+ Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an MDS-like
+ exploit which can leak bits from the random
+ number generator.
+
+ By default, this issue is mitigated by
+ microcode. However, the microcode fix can cause
+ the RDRAND and RDSEED instructions to become
+ much slower. Among other effects, this will
+ result in reduced throughput from /dev/urandom.
+
+ The microcode mitigation can be disabled with
+ the following option:
+
+ off: Disable mitigation and remove
+ performance impact to RDRAND and RDSEED
+
srcutree.counter_wrap_check [KNL]
Specifies how frequently to check for
grace-period sequence counter wrap for the
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 2dd4f37c9f10..a6dda75d18cd 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 5
PATCHLEVEL = 7
-SUBLEVEL = 1
+SUBLEVEL = 2
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h
index cf3d621c6892..10426cd56dca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h
@@ -20,12 +20,14 @@
#define X86_CENTAUR_FAM6_C7_D 0xd
#define X86_CENTAUR_FAM6_NANO 0xf
+#define X86_STEPPINGS(mins, maxs) GENMASK(maxs, mins)
/**
- * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE - Base macro for CPU matching
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE - Base macro for CPU matching
* @_vendor: The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
* The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@...ndor
* @_family: The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
* @_model: The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY
+ * @_steppings: Bitmask for steppings, stepping constant or X86_STEPPING_ANY
* @_feature: A X86_FEATURE bit or X86_FEATURE_ANY
* @_data: Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
* format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
@@ -37,15 +39,34 @@
* into another macro at the usage site for good reasons, then please
* start this local macro with X86_MATCH to allow easy grepping.
*/
-#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(_vendor, _family, _model, \
- _feature, _data) { \
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(_vendor, _family, _model, \
+ _steppings, _feature, _data) { \
.vendor = X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, \
.family = _family, \
.model = _model, \
+ .steppings = _steppings, \
.feature = _feature, \
.driver_data = (unsigned long) _data \
}
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE - Macro for CPU matching
+ * @_vendor: The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
+ * The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@...ndor
+ * @_family: The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
+ * @_model: The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY
+ * @_feature: A X86_FEATURE bit or X86_FEATURE_ANY
+ * @_data: Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ * format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ * etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * The steppings arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE() is
+ * set to wildcards.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(vendor, family, model, feature, data) \
+ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(vendor, family, model, \
+ X86_STEPPING_ANY, feature, data)
+
/**
* X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_FEATURE - Macro for matching vendor, family and CPU feature
* @vendor: The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index db189945e9b0..02dabc9e77b0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
#define X86_FEATURE_FSRM (18*32+ 4) /* Fast Short Rep Mov */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VP2INTERSECT (18*32+ 8) /* AVX-512 Intersect for D/Q */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL (18*32+ 9) /* "" SRBDS mitigation MSR available */
#define X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR (18*32+10) /* VERW clears CPU buffers */
#define X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT (18*32+13) /* "" TSX_FORCE_ABORT */
#define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG (18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
@@ -407,5 +408,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
#define X86_BUG_TAA X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
+#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 12c9684d59ba..3efde600a674 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -128,6 +128,10 @@
#define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE BIT(0) /* Disable RTM feature */
#define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR BIT(1) /* Disable TSX enumeration */
+/* SRBDS support */
+#define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123
+#define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0)
+
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP 0x00000176
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index ed54b3b21c39..56978cb06149 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -108,6 +109,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
l1tf_select_mitigation();
mds_select_mitigation();
taa_select_mitigation();
+ srbds_select_mitigation();
/*
* As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS
@@ -397,6 +399,97 @@ static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
}
early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SRBDS: " fmt
+
+enum srbds_mitigations {
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF,
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
+};
+
+static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
+static const char * const srbds_strings[] = {
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode",
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Microcode",
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF] = "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status",
+};
+
+static bool srbds_off;
+
+void update_srbds_msr(void)
+{
+ u64 mcu_ctrl;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+ return;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ return;
+
+ if (srbds_mitigation == SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED)
+ return;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+
+ switch (srbds_mitigation) {
+ case SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ case SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF:
+ mcu_ctrl |= RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
+ break;
+ case SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+ mcu_ctrl &= ~RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+}
+
+static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting
+ * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled.
+ */
+ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+ if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
+ else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
+ else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL))
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+ else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || srbds_off)
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
+ update_srbds_msr();
+ pr_info("%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+ return 0;
+
+ srbds_off = !strcmp(str, "off");
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("srbds", srbds_parse_cmdline);
+
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt
@@ -1528,6 +1621,11 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void)
return "";
}
+static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
+}
+
static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf, unsigned int bug)
{
@@ -1572,6 +1670,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
case X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT:
return itlb_multihit_show_state(buf);
+ case X86_BUG_SRBDS:
+ return srbds_show_state(buf);
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -1618,4 +1719,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index bed0cb83fe24..8293ee514975 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1075,9 +1075,30 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
{}
};
-static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
+#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues) \
+ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, \
+ INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \
+ X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
+
+#define SRBDS BIT(0)
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xC), SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xD), SRBDS),
+ {}
+};
+
+static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
{
- const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
+ const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
}
@@ -1097,31 +1118,34 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
- if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_SPECTRE_V2))
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECTRE_V2))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
- if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
}
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
/*
@@ -1139,7 +1163,16 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
- if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
+ /*
+ * SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed
+ * in the vulnerability blacklist.
+ */
+ if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) &&
+ cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -1148,7 +1181,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
- if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
@@ -1591,6 +1624,7 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
mtrr_ap_init();
validate_apic_and_package_id(c);
x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
+ update_srbds_msr();
}
static __init int setup_noclflush(char *arg)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
index 37fdefd14f28..fb538fccd24c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ extern void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu);
extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
+extern void update_srbds_msr(void);
extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
index d3482eb43ff3..ad6776081e60 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
@@ -39,13 +39,18 @@ const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match)
const struct x86_cpu_id *m;
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
- for (m = match; m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->feature; m++) {
+ for (m = match;
+ m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->steppings | m->feature;
+ m++) {
if (m->vendor != X86_VENDOR_ANY && c->x86_vendor != m->vendor)
continue;
if (m->family != X86_FAMILY_ANY && c->x86 != m->family)
continue;
if (m->model != X86_MODEL_ANY && c->x86_model != m->model)
continue;
+ if (m->steppings != X86_STEPPING_ANY &&
+ !(BIT(c->x86_stepping) & m->steppings))
+ continue;
if (m->feature != X86_FEATURE_ANY && !cpu_has(c, m->feature))
continue;
return m;
diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c
index 9a1c00fbbaef..d2136ab9b14a 100644
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -562,6 +562,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev,
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
}
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
@@ -570,6 +576,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL);
static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -580,6 +587,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_mds.attr,
&dev_attr_tsx_async_abort.attr,
&dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
+ &dev_attr_srbds.attr,
NULL
};
diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c b/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c
index 2df88d2b880a..0e2068ec068b 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c
@@ -65,12 +65,14 @@ struct stm32_adc_priv;
* @clk_sel: clock selection routine
* @max_clk_rate_hz: maximum analog clock rate (Hz, from datasheet)
* @has_syscfg: SYSCFG capability flags
+ * @num_irqs: number of interrupt lines
*/
struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg {
const struct stm32_adc_common_regs *regs;
int (*clk_sel)(struct platform_device *, struct stm32_adc_priv *);
u32 max_clk_rate_hz;
unsigned int has_syscfg;
+ unsigned int num_irqs;
};
/**
@@ -375,21 +377,15 @@ static int stm32_adc_irq_probe(struct platform_device *pdev,
struct device_node *np = pdev->dev.of_node;
unsigned int i;
- for (i = 0; i < STM32_ADC_MAX_ADCS; i++) {
+ /*
+ * Interrupt(s) must be provided, depending on the compatible:
+ * - stm32f4/h7 shares a common interrupt line.
+ * - stm32mp1, has one line per ADC
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < priv->cfg->num_irqs; i++) {
priv->irq[i] = platform_get_irq(pdev, i);
- if (priv->irq[i] < 0) {
- /*
- * At least one interrupt must be provided, make others
- * optional:
- * - stm32f4/h7 shares a common interrupt.
- * - stm32mp1, has one line per ADC (either for ADC1,
- * ADC2 or both).
- */
- if (i && priv->irq[i] == -ENXIO)
- continue;
-
+ if (priv->irq[i] < 0)
return priv->irq[i];
- }
}
priv->domain = irq_domain_add_simple(np, STM32_ADC_MAX_ADCS, 0,
@@ -400,9 +396,7 @@ static int stm32_adc_irq_probe(struct platform_device *pdev,
return -ENOMEM;
}
- for (i = 0; i < STM32_ADC_MAX_ADCS; i++) {
- if (priv->irq[i] < 0)
- continue;
+ for (i = 0; i < priv->cfg->num_irqs; i++) {
irq_set_chained_handler(priv->irq[i], stm32_adc_irq_handler);
irq_set_handler_data(priv->irq[i], priv);
}
@@ -420,11 +414,8 @@ static void stm32_adc_irq_remove(struct platform_device *pdev,
irq_dispose_mapping(irq_find_mapping(priv->domain, hwirq));
irq_domain_remove(priv->domain);
- for (i = 0; i < STM32_ADC_MAX_ADCS; i++) {
- if (priv->irq[i] < 0)
- continue;
+ for (i = 0; i < priv->cfg->num_irqs; i++)
irq_set_chained_handler(priv->irq[i], NULL);
- }
}
static int stm32_adc_core_switches_supply_en(struct stm32_adc_priv *priv,
@@ -817,6 +808,7 @@ static const struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg stm32f4_adc_priv_cfg = {
.regs = &stm32f4_adc_common_regs,
.clk_sel = stm32f4_adc_clk_sel,
.max_clk_rate_hz = 36000000,
+ .num_irqs = 1,
};
static const struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg stm32h7_adc_priv_cfg = {
@@ -824,6 +816,7 @@ static const struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg stm32h7_adc_priv_cfg = {
.clk_sel = stm32h7_adc_clk_sel,
.max_clk_rate_hz = 36000000,
.has_syscfg = HAS_VBOOSTER,
+ .num_irqs = 1,
};
static const struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg stm32mp1_adc_priv_cfg = {
@@ -831,6 +824,7 @@ static const struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg stm32mp1_adc_priv_cfg = {
.clk_sel = stm32h7_adc_clk_sel,
.max_clk_rate_hz = 40000000,
.has_syscfg = HAS_VBOOSTER | HAS_ANASWVDD,
+ .num_irqs = 2,
};
static const struct of_device_id stm32_adc_of_match[] = {
diff --git a/drivers/iio/chemical/pms7003.c b/drivers/iio/chemical/pms7003.c
index 23c9ab252470..07bb90d72434 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/chemical/pms7003.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/chemical/pms7003.c
@@ -73,6 +73,11 @@ struct pms7003_state {
struct pms7003_frame frame;
struct completion frame_ready;
struct mutex lock; /* must be held whenever state gets touched */
+ /* Used to construct scan to push to the IIO buffer */
+ struct {
+ u16 data[3]; /* PM1, PM2P5, PM10 */
+ s64 ts;
+ } scan;
};
static int pms7003_do_cmd(struct pms7003_state *state, enum pms7003_cmd cmd)
@@ -104,7 +109,6 @@ static irqreturn_t pms7003_trigger_handler(int irq, void *p)
struct iio_dev *indio_dev = pf->indio_dev;
struct pms7003_state *state = iio_priv(indio_dev);
struct pms7003_frame *frame = &state->frame;
- u16 data[3 + 1 + 4]; /* PM1, PM2P5, PM10, padding, timestamp */
int ret;
mutex_lock(&state->lock);
@@ -114,12 +118,15 @@ static irqreturn_t pms7003_trigger_handler(int irq, void *p)
goto err;
}
- data[PM1] = pms7003_get_pm(frame->data + PMS7003_PM1_OFFSET);
- data[PM2P5] = pms7003_get_pm(frame->data + PMS7003_PM2P5_OFFSET);
- data[PM10] = pms7003_get_pm(frame->data + PMS7003_PM10_OFFSET);
+ state->scan.data[PM1] =
+ pms7003_get_pm(frame->data + PMS7003_PM1_OFFSET);
+ state->scan.data[PM2P5] =
+ pms7003_get_pm(frame->data + PMS7003_PM2P5_OFFSET);
+ state->scan.data[PM10] =
+ pms7003_get_pm(frame->data + PMS7003_PM10_OFFSET);
mutex_unlock(&state->lock);
- iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp(indio_dev, data,
+ iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp(indio_dev, &state->scan,
iio_get_time_ns(indio_dev));
err:
iio_trigger_notify_done(indio_dev->trig);
diff --git a/drivers/iio/chemical/sps30.c b/drivers/iio/chemical/sps30.c
index acb9f8ecbb3d..a88c1fb875a0 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/chemical/sps30.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/chemical/sps30.c
@@ -230,15 +230,18 @@ static irqreturn_t sps30_trigger_handler(int irq, void *p)
struct iio_dev *indio_dev = pf->indio_dev;
struct sps30_state *state = iio_priv(indio_dev);
int ret;
- s32 data[4 + 2]; /* PM1, PM2P5, PM4, PM10, timestamp */
+ struct {
+ s32 data[4]; /* PM1, PM2P5, PM4, PM10 */
+ s64 ts;
+ } scan;
mutex_lock(&state->lock);
- ret = sps30_do_meas(state, data, 4);
+ ret = sps30_do_meas(state, scan.data, ARRAY_SIZE(scan.data));
mutex_unlock(&state->lock);
if (ret)
goto err;
- iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp(indio_dev, data,
+ iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp(indio_dev, &scan,
iio_get_time_ns(indio_dev));
err:
iio_trigger_notify_done(indio_dev->trig);
diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c b/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c
index ec803c1e81df..5d476f174a90 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c
@@ -219,7 +219,6 @@ static int vcnl4000_measure(struct vcnl4000_data *data, u8 req_mask,
u8 rdy_mask, u8 data_reg, int *val)
{
int tries = 20;
- __be16 buf;
int ret;
mutex_lock(&data->vcnl4000_lock);
@@ -246,13 +245,12 @@ static int vcnl4000_measure(struct vcnl4000_data *data, u8 req_mask,
goto fail;
}
- ret = i2c_smbus_read_i2c_block_data(data->client,
- data_reg, sizeof(buf), (u8 *) &buf);
+ ret = i2c_smbus_read_word_swapped(data->client, data_reg);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
mutex_unlock(&data->vcnl4000_lock);
- *val = be16_to_cpu(buf);
+ *val = ret;
return 0;
diff --git a/drivers/nvmem/qfprom.c b/drivers/nvmem/qfprom.c
index d057f1bfb2e9..8a91717600be 100644
--- a/drivers/nvmem/qfprom.c
+++ b/drivers/nvmem/qfprom.c
@@ -27,25 +27,11 @@ static int qfprom_reg_read(void *context,
return 0;
}
-static int qfprom_reg_write(void *context,
- unsigned int reg, void *_val, size_t bytes)
-{
- struct qfprom_priv *priv = context;
- u8 *val = _val;
- int i = 0, words = bytes;
-
- while (words--)
- writeb(*val++, priv->base + reg + i++);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
static struct nvmem_config econfig = {
.name = "qfprom",
.stride = 1,
.word_size = 1,
.reg_read = qfprom_reg_read,
- .reg_write = qfprom_reg_write,
};
static int qfprom_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h
index be731f1a2209..91b65731fcaa 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ static inline unsigned char *get_hdr_bssid(unsigned char *pframe)
/* block-ack parameters */
#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_POLICY_MASK 0x0002
#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0x003C
-#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFA0
+#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFC0
#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0xF000
#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_INITIATOR_MASK 0x0800
@@ -532,13 +532,6 @@ struct ieee80211_ht_addt_info {
#define IEEE80211_HT_IE_NON_GF_STA_PRSNT 0x0004
#define IEEE80211_HT_IE_NON_HT_STA_PRSNT 0x0010
-/* block-ack parameters */
-#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_POLICY_MASK 0x0002
-#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0x003C
-#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFA0
-#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0xF000
-#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_INITIATOR_MASK 0x0800
-
/*
* A-PMDU buffer sizes
* According to IEEE802.11n spec size varies from 8K to 64K (in powers of 2)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c b/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c
index 436cc51c92c3..cdcc64ea2554 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c
@@ -371,15 +371,14 @@ static int hvc_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp)
* tty fields and return the kref reference.
*/
if (rc) {
- tty_port_tty_set(&hp->port, NULL);
- tty->driver_data = NULL;
- tty_port_put(&hp->port);
printk(KERN_ERR "hvc_open: request_irq failed with rc %d.\n", rc);
- } else
+ } else {
/* We are ready... raise DTR/RTS */
if (C_BAUD(tty))
if (hp->ops->dtr_rts)
hp->ops->dtr_rts(hp, 1);
+ tty_port_set_initialized(&hp->port, true);
+ }
/* Force wakeup of the polling thread */
hvc_kick();
@@ -389,22 +388,12 @@ static int hvc_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp)
static void hvc_close(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp)
{
- struct hvc_struct *hp;
+ struct hvc_struct *hp = tty->driver_data;
unsigned long flags;
if (tty_hung_up_p(filp))
return;
- /*
- * No driver_data means that this close was issued after a failed
- * hvc_open by the tty layer's release_dev() function and we can just
- * exit cleanly because the kref reference wasn't made.
- */
- if (!tty->driver_data)
- return;
-
- hp = tty->driver_data;
-
spin_lock_irqsave(&hp->port.lock, flags);
if (--hp->port.count == 0) {
@@ -412,6 +401,9 @@ static void hvc_close(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp)
/* We are done with the tty pointer now. */
tty_port_tty_set(&hp->port, NULL);
+ if (!tty_port_initialized(&hp->port))
+ return;
+
if (C_HUPCL(tty))
if (hp->ops->dtr_rts)
hp->ops->dtr_rts(hp, 0);
@@ -428,6 +420,7 @@ static void hvc_close(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp)
* waking periodically to check chars_in_buffer().
*/
tty_wait_until_sent(tty, HVC_CLOSE_WAIT);
+ tty_port_set_initialized(&hp->port, false);
} else {
if (hp->port.count < 0)
printk(KERN_ERR "hvc_close %X: oops, count is %d\n",
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/Kconfig b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/Kconfig
index af0688156dd0..8195a31519ea 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/Kconfig
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ config SERIAL_8250_PNP
config SERIAL_8250_16550A_VARIANTS
bool "Support for variants of the 16550A serial port"
depends on SERIAL_8250
+ default !X86
help
The 8250 driver can probe for many variants of the venerable 16550A
serial port. Doing so takes additional time at boot.
diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c b/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c
index 15d33fa0c925..568b2171f335 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c
@@ -127,7 +127,11 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(func_buf_lock); /* guard 'func_buf' and friends */
static unsigned long key_down[BITS_TO_LONGS(KEY_CNT)]; /* keyboard key bitmap */
static unsigned char shift_down[NR_SHIFT]; /* shift state counters.. */
static bool dead_key_next;
-static int npadch = -1; /* -1 or number assembled on pad */
+
+/* Handles a number being assembled on the number pad */
+static bool npadch_active;
+static unsigned int npadch_value;
+
static unsigned int diacr;
static char rep; /* flag telling character repeat */
@@ -845,12 +849,12 @@ static void k_shift(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)
shift_state &= ~(1 << value);
/* kludge */
- if (up_flag && shift_state != old_state && npadch != -1) {
+ if (up_flag && shift_state != old_state && npadch_active) {
if (kbd->kbdmode == VC_UNICODE)
- to_utf8(vc, npadch);
+ to_utf8(vc, npadch_value);
else
- put_queue(vc, npadch & 0xff);
- npadch = -1;
+ put_queue(vc, npadch_value & 0xff);
+ npadch_active = false;
}
}
@@ -868,7 +872,7 @@ static void k_meta(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)
static void k_ascii(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)
{
- int base;
+ unsigned int base;
if (up_flag)
return;
@@ -882,10 +886,12 @@ static void k_ascii(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)
base = 16;
}
- if (npadch == -1)
- npadch = value;
- else
- npadch = npadch * base + value;
+ if (!npadch_active) {
+ npadch_value = 0;
+ npadch_active = true;
+ }
+
+ npadch_value = npadch_value * base + value;
}
static void k_lock(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c
index ded8d93834ca..f67088bb8218 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ static void acm_softint(struct work_struct *work)
}
if (test_and_clear_bit(ACM_ERROR_DELAY, &acm->flags)) {
- for (i = 0; i < ACM_NR; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < acm->rx_buflimit; i++)
if (test_and_clear_bit(i, &acm->urbs_in_error_delay))
acm_submit_read_urb(acm, i, GFP_NOIO);
}
diff --git a/drivers/usb/musb/jz4740.c b/drivers/usb/musb/jz4740.c
index e64dd30e80e7..c4fe1f4cd17a 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/musb/jz4740.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/musb/jz4740.c
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ static irqreturn_t jz4740_musb_interrupt(int irq, void *__hci)
irqreturn_t retval = IRQ_NONE, retval_dma = IRQ_NONE;
struct musb *musb = __hci;
- spin_lock_irqsave(&musb->lock, flags);
-
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB_INVENTRA_DMA) && musb->dma_controller)
retval_dma = dma_controller_irq(irq, musb->dma_controller);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&musb->lock, flags);
+
musb->int_usb = musb_readb(musb->mregs, MUSB_INTRUSB);
musb->int_tx = musb_readw(musb->mregs, MUSB_INTRTX);
musb->int_rx = musb_readw(musb->mregs, MUSB_INTRRX);
diff --git a/drivers/usb/musb/musb_core.c b/drivers/usb/musb/musb_core.c
index d590110539ab..48178aeccf5b 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/musb/musb_core.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/musb/musb_core.c
@@ -2877,6 +2877,13 @@ static int musb_resume(struct device *dev)
musb_enable_interrupts(musb);
musb_platform_enable(musb);
+ /* session might be disabled in suspend */
+ if (musb->port_mode == MUSB_HOST &&
+ !(musb->ops->quirks & MUSB_PRESERVE_SESSION)) {
+ devctl |= MUSB_DEVCTL_SESSION;
+ musb_writeb(musb->mregs, MUSB_DEVCTL, devctl);
+ }
+
spin_lock_irqsave(&musb->lock, flags);
error = musb_run_resume_work(musb);
if (error)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/musb/musb_debugfs.c b/drivers/usb/musb/musb_debugfs.c
index 7b6281ab62ed..30a89aa8a3e7 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/musb/musb_debugfs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/musb/musb_debugfs.c
@@ -168,6 +168,11 @@ static ssize_t musb_test_mode_write(struct file *file,
u8 test;
char buf[24];
+ memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
+
+ if (copy_from_user(buf, ubuf, min_t(size_t, sizeof(buf) - 1, count)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
pm_runtime_get_sync(musb->controller);
test = musb_readb(musb->mregs, MUSB_TESTMODE);
if (test) {
@@ -176,11 +181,6 @@ static ssize_t musb_test_mode_write(struct file *file,
goto ret;
}
- memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
-
- if (copy_from_user(buf, ubuf, min_t(size_t, sizeof(buf) - 1, count)))
- return -EFAULT;
-
if (strstarts(buf, "force host full-speed"))
test = MUSB_TEST_FORCE_HOST | MUSB_TEST_FORCE_FS;
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/ch341.c b/drivers/usb/serial/ch341.c
index c5ecdcd51ffc..89675ee29645 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/ch341.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/ch341.c
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@
#define CH341_LCR_CS6 0x01
#define CH341_LCR_CS5 0x00
+#define CH341_QUIRK_LIMITED_PRESCALER BIT(0)
+
static const struct usb_device_id id_table[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(0x4348, 0x5523) },
{ USB_DEVICE(0x1a86, 0x7523) },
@@ -87,6 +89,7 @@ struct ch341_private {
u8 mcr;
u8 msr;
u8 lcr;
+ unsigned long quirks;
};
static void ch341_set_termios(struct tty_struct *tty,
@@ -159,9 +162,11 @@ static const speed_t ch341_min_rates[] = {
* 2 <= div <= 256 if fact = 0, or
* 9 <= div <= 256 if fact = 1
*/
-static int ch341_get_divisor(speed_t speed)
+static int ch341_get_divisor(struct ch341_private *priv)
{
unsigned int fact, div, clk_div;
+ speed_t speed = priv->baud_rate;
+ bool force_fact0 = false;
int ps;
/*
@@ -187,8 +192,12 @@ static int ch341_get_divisor(speed_t speed)
clk_div = CH341_CLK_DIV(ps, fact);
div = CH341_CLKRATE / (clk_div * speed);
+ /* Some devices require a lower base clock if ps < 3. */
+ if (ps < 3 && (priv->quirks & CH341_QUIRK_LIMITED_PRESCALER))
+ force_fact0 = true;
+
/* Halve base clock (fact = 0) if required. */
- if (div < 9 || div > 255) {
+ if (div < 9 || div > 255 || force_fact0) {
div /= 2;
clk_div *= 2;
fact = 0;
@@ -227,7 +236,7 @@ static int ch341_set_baudrate_lcr(struct usb_device *dev,
if (!priv->baud_rate)
return -EINVAL;
- val = ch341_get_divisor(priv->baud_rate);
+ val = ch341_get_divisor(priv);
if (val < 0)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -308,6 +317,54 @@ out: kfree(buffer);
return r;
}
+static int ch341_detect_quirks(struct usb_serial_port *port)
+{
+ struct ch341_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
+ struct usb_device *udev = port->serial->dev;
+ const unsigned int size = 2;
+ unsigned long quirks = 0;
+ char *buffer;
+ int r;
+
+ buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buffer)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * A subset of CH34x devices does not support all features. The
+ * prescaler is limited and there is no support for sending a RS232
+ * break condition. A read failure when trying to set up the latter is
+ * used to detect these devices.
+ */
+ r = usb_control_msg(udev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(udev, 0), CH341_REQ_READ_REG,
+ USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_RECIP_DEVICE | USB_DIR_IN,
+ CH341_REG_BREAK, 0, buffer, size, DEFAULT_TIMEOUT);
+ if (r == -EPIPE) {
+ dev_dbg(&port->dev, "break control not supported\n");
+ quirks = CH341_QUIRK_LIMITED_PRESCALER;
+ r = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (r != size) {
+ if (r >= 0)
+ r = -EIO;
+ dev_err(&port->dev, "failed to read break control: %d\n", r);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r = 0;
+out:
+ kfree(buffer);
+
+ if (quirks) {
+ dev_dbg(&port->dev, "enabling quirk flags: 0x%02lx\n", quirks);
+ priv->quirks |= quirks;
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
static int ch341_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct ch341_private *priv;
@@ -330,6 +387,11 @@ static int ch341_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
goto error;
usb_set_serial_port_data(port, priv);
+
+ r = ch341_detect_quirks(port);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto error;
+
return 0;
error: kfree(priv);
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
index 8bfffca3e4ae..254a8bbeea67 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
@@ -1157,6 +1157,10 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_CC864_SINGLE) },
{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_DE910_DUAL) },
{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_UE910_V2) },
+ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1031, 0xff), /* Telit LE910C1-EUX */
+ .driver_info = NCTRL(0) | RSVD(3) },
+ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1033, 0xff), /* Telit LE910C1-EUX (ECM) */
+ .driver_info = NCTRL(0) },
{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_LE922_USBCFG0),
.driver_info = RSVD(0) | RSVD(1) | NCTRL(2) | RSVD(3) },
{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_LE922_USBCFG1),
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c b/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c
index ce0401d3137f..d147feae83e6 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table[] = {
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b3)}, /* Dell Wireless 5809e Gobi(TM) 4G LTE Mobile Broadband Card (rev3) */
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b5)}, /* Dell Wireless 5811e QDL */
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b6)}, /* Dell Wireless 5811e QDL */
+ {DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cb)}, /* Dell Wireless 5816e QDL */
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cc)}, /* Dell Wireless 5816e */
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cf)}, /* Dell Wireless 5819 */
{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81d0)}, /* Dell Wireless 5819 */
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c b/drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c
index 13be21aad2f4..4b9845807bee 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c
@@ -270,6 +270,10 @@ static void usb_wwan_indat_callback(struct urb *urb)
if (status) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s: nonzero status: %d on endpoint %02x.\n",
__func__, status, endpoint);
+
+ /* don't resubmit on fatal errors */
+ if (status == -ESHUTDOWN || status == -ENOENT)
+ return;
} else {
if (urb->actual_length) {
tty_insert_flip_string(&port->port, data,
diff --git a/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h b/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h
index 4c2ddd0941a7..0754b8d71262 100644
--- a/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h
+++ b/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h
@@ -663,6 +663,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id {
__u16 vendor;
__u16 family;
__u16 model;
+ __u16 steppings;
__u16 feature; /* bit index */
kernel_ulong_t driver_data;
};
@@ -671,6 +672,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id {
#define X86_VENDOR_ANY 0xffff
#define X86_FAMILY_ANY 0
#define X86_MODEL_ANY 0
+#define X86_STEPPING_ANY 0
#define X86_FEATURE_ANY 0 /* Same as FPU, you can't test for that */
/*
diff --git a/kernel/events/uprobes.c b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
index ece7e13f6e4a..cc2095607c74 100644
--- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c
+++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
@@ -867,10 +867,6 @@ static int prepare_uprobe(struct uprobe *uprobe, struct file *file,
if (ret)
goto out;
- /* uprobe_write_opcode() assumes we don't cross page boundary */
- BUG_ON((uprobe->offset & ~PAGE_MASK) +
- UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE);
-
smp_wmb(); /* pairs with the smp_rmb() in handle_swbp() */
set_bit(UPROBE_COPY_INSN, &uprobe->flags);
@@ -1166,6 +1162,15 @@ static int __uprobe_register(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset,
if (offset > i_size_read(inode))
return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * This ensures that copy_from_page(), copy_to_page() and
+ * __update_ref_ctr() can't cross page boundary.
+ */
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(offset, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
retry:
uprobe = alloc_uprobe(inode, offset, ref_ctr_offset);
if (!uprobe)
@@ -2014,6 +2019,9 @@ static int is_trap_at_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vaddr)
uprobe_opcode_t opcode;
int result;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!IS_ALIGNED(vaddr, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
pagefault_disable();
result = __get_user(opcode, (uprobe_opcode_t __user *)vaddr);
pagefault_enable();
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