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Date:   Fri, 12 Jun 2020 07:48:20 +0000
From:   Dexuan Cui <decui@...rosoft.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        vkuznets <vkuznets@...hat.com>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
        Michael Kelley <mikelley@...rosoft.com>,
        Ju-Hyoung Lee <juhlee@...rosoft.com>
CC:     "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org" <linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        KY Srinivasan <kys@...rosoft.com>,
        Stephen Hemminger <stephen@...workplumber.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: RE: hv_hypercall_pg page permissios

> From: linux-hyperv-owner@...r.kernel.org
> <linux-hyperv-owner@...r.kernel.org> On Behalf Of Andy Lutomirski
> Sent: Tuesday, April 7, 2020 2:01 PM
> To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>
> Cc: vkuznets <vkuznets@...hat.com>; x86@...nel.org;
> linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org; linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org; KY Srinivasan
> <kys@...rosoft.com>; Stephen Hemminger <stephen@...workplumber.org>;
> Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>; Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
> Subject: Re: hv_hypercall_pg page permissios
> 
> 
> > On Apr 7, 2020, at 12:38 AM, Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Apr 07, 2020 at 09:28:01AM +0200, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
> >> Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de> writes:
> >>
> >>> Hi all,
> >>>
> >>> The x86 Hyper-V hypercall page (hv_hypercall_pg) is the only allocation
> >>> in the kernel using __vmalloc with exectutable persmissions, and the
> >>> only user of PAGE_KERNEL_RX.  Is there any good reason it needs to
> >>> be readable?  Otherwise we could use vmalloc_exec and kill off
> >>> PAGE_KERNEL_RX.  Note that before 372b1e91343e6 ("drivers: hv: Turn
> off
> >>> write permission on the hypercall page") it was even mapped writable..
> >>
> >> [There is nothing secret in the hypercall page, by reading it you can
> >> figure out if you're running on Intel or AMD (VMCALL/VMMCALL) but it's
> >> likely not the only possible way :-)]
> >>
> >> I see no reason for hv_hypercall_pg to remain readable. I just
> >> smoke-tested
> >
> > Thanks, I have the same in my WIP tree, but just wanted to confirm this
> > makes sense.
> 
> Just to make sure we’re all on the same page: x86 doesn’t normally have an
> execute-only mode. Executable memory in the kernel is readable unless you
> are using fancy hypervisor-based XO support.

Hi hch,
The patch is merged into the mainine recently, but unluckily we noticed
a warning with CONFIG_DEBUG_WX=y (it looks typically this config is defined
by default in Linux distros, at least in Ubuntu 18.04's  
/boot/config-4.18.0-11-generic).

Should we revert this patch, or figure out a way to ask the DEBUG_WX code to
ignore this page?

[   19.387536] debug: unmapping init [mem 0xffffffff82713000-0xffffffff82886fff]
[   19.431766] Write protecting the kernel read-only data: 18432k
[   19.438662] debug: unmapping init [mem 0xffffffff81c02000-0xffffffff81dfffff]
[   19.446830] debug: unmapping init [mem 0xffffffff821d6000-0xffffffff821fffff]
[   19.522368] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   19.527495] x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address 0xffffc90000012000
[   19.535066] WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:248 note_page+0x639/0x690
[   19.539038] Modules linked in:
[   19.539038] CPU: 26 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.7.0+ #1
[   19.539038] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS 090008  12/07/2018
[   19.539038] RIP: 0010:note_page+0x639/0x690
[   19.539038] Code: fe ff ff 31 c0 e9 a0 fe ff ff 80 3d 39 d1 31 01 00 0f 85 76 fa ff ff 48 c7 c7 98 55 0a 82 c6 05 25 d1 31 01 01 e8 f7 c9 00 00 <0f> 0b e9 5c fa ff ff 48 83 c0 18 48 c7 45 68 00 00 00 00 48 89 45
[   19.539038] RSP: 0000:ffffc90003137cb0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[   19.539038] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000007
[   19.539038] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff810fa9c4
[   19.539038] RBP: ffffc90003137ea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   19.539038] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc90000013000
[   19.539038] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc900001ff000 R15: 0000000000000000
[   19.539038] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8884dad00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   19.539038] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   19.539038] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000002210001 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[   19.539038] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   19.539038] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   19.539038] Call Trace:
[   19.539038]  ptdump_pte_entry+0x39/0x40
[   19.539038]  __walk_page_range+0x5b7/0x960
[   19.539038]  walk_page_range_novma+0x7e/0xd0
[   19.539038]  ptdump_walk_pgd+0x53/0x90
[   19.539038]  ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core+0xdf/0x110
[   19.539038]  ? ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs+0x40/0x40
[   19.539038]  ? hugetlb_get_unmapped_area+0x2f0/0x2f0
[   19.703692]  ? rest_init+0x24d/0x24d
[   19.703692]  ? rest_init+0x24d/0x24d
[   19.703692]  kernel_init+0x2c/0x113
[   19.703692]  ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
[   19.703692] irq event stamp: 2840666
[   19.703692] hardirqs last  enabled at (2840665): [<ffffffff810fa9c4>] console_unlock+0x444/0x5b0
[   19.703692] hardirqs last disabled at (2840666): [<ffffffff81001ec9>] trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
[   19.703692] softirqs last  enabled at (2840662): [<ffffffff81c00366>] __do_softirq+0x366/0x490
[   19.703692] softirqs last disabled at (2840655): [<ffffffff8107dba8>] irq_exit+0xe8/0x100
[   19.703692] ---[ end trace 99ca90806a8e657c ]---
[   19.786235] x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 1 W+X pages found.
[   19.793298] rodata_test: all tests were successful
[   19.798508] x86/mm: Checking user space page tables
[   19.818007] x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found.

Thanks,
-- Dexuan

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