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Date:   Tue, 16 Jun 2020 21:19:45 -0000
From:   "tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To:     linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
        Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@...gle.com>,
        x86 <x86@...nel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [tip: x86/cpu] x86/speculation: Merge one test in
 spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()

The following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     a5ce9f2bb665d1d2b31f139a02dbaa2dfbb62fa6
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/a5ce9f2bb665d1d2b31f139a02dbaa2dfbb62fa6
Author:        Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
AuthorDate:    Mon, 15 Jun 2020 08:51:25 +02:00
Committer:     Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
CommitterDate: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 23:14:47 +02:00

x86/speculation: Merge one test in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()

Merge the test whether the CPU supports STIBP into the test which
determines whether STIBP is required. Thus try to simplify what is
already an insane logic.

Remove a superfluous newline in a comment, while at it.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Cc: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@...gle.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200615065806.GB14668@zn.tnic
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 13 ++++---------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 0b71970..7beaefa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -763,10 +763,12 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * If enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not
+	 * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not
 	 * required.
 	 */
-	if (!smt_possible || spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
+	    !smt_possible ||
+	    spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
 		return;
 
 	/*
@@ -778,12 +780,6 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON))
 		mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;
 
-	/*
-	 * If STIBP is not available, clear the STIBP mode.
-	 */
-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
-		mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
-
 	spectre_v2_user_stibp = mode;
 
 set_mode:
@@ -1270,7 +1266,6 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 		 * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
 		 * mode. It can neither be enabled if it was force-disabled
 		 * by a  previous prctl call.
-
 		 */
 		if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
 		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||

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