Message-ID: <20200616091247.hdmxcrnlrrxih7my@steredhat>
Date:   Tue, 16 Jun 2020 11:12:47 +0200
From:   Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@...hat.com>
To:     Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
        Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
        Aleksa Sarai <asarai@...e.de>,
        Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@...hat.com>,
        Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@...hat.com>,
        io-uring <io-uring@...r.kernel.org>,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] io_uring: add restrictions to support untrusted
 applications and guests

On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 11:00:25AM -0600, Jens Axboe wrote:
> On 6/15/20 7:33 AM, Stefano Garzarella wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 11:04:06AM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> >> +Kees, Christian, Sargun, Aleksa, kernel-hardening for their opinions
> >> on seccomp-related aspects
> >>
> >> On Tue, Jun 9, 2020 at 4:24 PM Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@...hat.com> wrote:
> >>> Hi Jens,
> >>> Stefan and I have a proposal to share with io_uring community.
> >>> Before implementing it we would like to discuss it to receive feedbacks and
> >>> to see if it could be accepted:
> >>>
> >>> Adding restrictions to io_uring
> >>> =====================================
> >>> The io_uring API provides submission and completion queues for performing
> >>> asynchronous I/O operations. The queues are located in memory that is
> >>> accessible to both the host userspace application and the kernel, making it
> >>> possible to monitor for activity through polling instead of system calls. This
> >>> design offers good performance and this makes exposing io_uring to guests an
> >>> attractive idea for improving I/O performance in virtualization.
> >> [...]
> >>> Restrictions
> >>> ------------
> >>> This document proposes io_uring API changes that safely allow untrusted
> >>> applications or guests to use io_uring. io_uring's existing security model is
> >>> that of kernel system call handler code. It is designed to reject invalid
> >>> inputs from host userspace applications. Supporting guests as io_uring API
> >>> clients adds a new trust domain with access to even fewer resources than host
> >>> userspace applications.
> >>>
> >>> Guests do not have direct access to host userspace application file descriptors
> >>> or memory. The host userspace application, a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) such
> >>> as QEMU, grants access to a subset of its file descriptors and memory. The
> >>> allowed file descriptors are typically the disk image files belonging to the
> >>> guest. The memory is typically the virtual machine's RAM that the VMM has
> >>> allocated on behalf of the guest.
> >>>
> >>> The following extensions to the io_uring API allow the host application to
> >>> grant access to some of its file descriptors.
> >>>
> >>> These extensions are designed to be applicable to other use cases besides
> >>> untrusted guests and are not virtualization-specific. For example, the
> >>> restrictions can be used to allow only a subset of sqe operations available to
> >>> an application similar to seccomp syscall whitelisting.
> >>>
> >>> An address translation and memory restriction mechanism would also be
> >>> necessary, but we can discuss this later.
> >>>
> >>> The IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode
> >>> ----------------------------------------
> >>> The new io_uring_register(2) IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode permanently
> >>> installs a feature whitelist on an io_ring_ctx. The io_ring_ctx can then be
> >>> passed to untrusted code with the knowledge that only operations present in the
> >>> whitelist can be executed.
> >>
> >> This approach of first creating a normal io_uring instance and then
> >> installing restrictions separately in a second syscall means that it
> >> won't be possible to use seccomp to restrict newly created io_uring
> >> instances; code that should be subject to seccomp restrictions and
> >> uring restrictions would only be able to use preexisting io_uring
> >> instances that have already been configured by trusted code.
> >>
> >> So I think that from the seccomp perspective, it might be preferable
> >> to set up these restrictions in the io_uring_setup() syscall. It might
> >> also be a bit nicer from a code cleanliness perspective, since you
> >> won't have to worry about concurrently changing restrictions.
> >>
> > 
> > Thank you for these details!
> > 
> > It seems feasible to include the restrictions during io_uring_setup().
> > 
> > The only doubt concerns the possibility of allowing the trusted code to
> > do some operations, before passing queues to the untrusted code, for
> > example registering file descriptors, buffers, eventfds, etc.
> > 
> > To avoid this, I should include these operations in io_uring_setup(),
> > adding some code that I wanted to avoid by reusing io_uring_register().
> > 
> > If I add restrictions in io_uring_setup() and then add an operation to
> > go into safe mode (e.g. a flag in io_uring_enter()), we would have the same
> > problem, right?
> > 
> > Just to be clear, I mean something like this:
> > 
> >     /* params will include restrictions */
> >     fd = io_uring_setup(entries, params);
> > 
> >     /* trusted code */
> >     io_uring_register_files(fd, ...);
> >     io_uring_register_buffers(fd, ...);
> >     io_uring_register_eventfd(fd, ...);
> > 
> >     /* enable safe mode */
> >     io_uring_enter(fd, ..., IORING_ENTER_ENABLE_RESTRICTIONS);
> > 
> > 
> > Anyway, including a list of things to register in the 'params', passed
> > to io_uring_setup(), should be feasible, if Jens agree :-)
> 
> I wonder how best to deal with this, in terms of ring visibility vs
> registering restrictions. We could potentially start the ring in a
> disabled mode, if asked to. It'd still be visible in terms of having
> the fd installed, but it'd just error requests. That'd leave you with
> time to do the various setup routines needed before then flagging it
> as enabled. My only worry on that would be adding overhead for doing
> that. It'd be cheap enough to check for IORING_SETUP_DISABLED in
> ctx->flags in io_uring_enter(), and return -EBADFD or something if
> that's the case. That doesn't cover the SQPOLL case though, but maybe we
> just don't start the sq thread if IORING_SETUP_DISABLED is set.

It seems to me a very good approach and easy to implement. In this way
we can reuse io_uring_register() without having to modify too much
io_uring_setup().

> 
> We'd need a way to clear IORING_SETUP_DISABLED through
> io_uring_register(). When clearing, that could then start the sq thread
> as well, when SQPOLL is set.

Could we do it using io_uring_enter() since we have a flag field or
do you think it's semantically incorrect?

@Jann, do you think this could work with seccomp?

Thanks,
Stefano

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