linux-kernel - Re: hv_hypercall

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Message-ID: <20200616102412.GB29684@lst.de>
Date:   Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:24:12 +0200
From:   Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>
To:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc:     Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>, Dexuan Cui <decui@...rosoft.com>,
        vkuznets <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Stephen Hemminger <stephen@...workplumber.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Michael Kelley <mikelley@...rosoft.com>,
        Ju-Hyoung Lee <juhlee@...rosoft.com>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org" <linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        KY Srinivasan <kys@...rosoft.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Subject: Re: hv_hypercall_pg page permissios

On Tue, Jun 16, 2020 at 12:23:50PM +0200, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 16, 2020 at 12:18:07PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > It does.  But it also means every other user of PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC
> > > should trigger this, of which there are a few (kexec, tboot, hibernate,
> > > early xen pv mapping, early SEV identity mapping)
> > 
> > There are only 3 users in the entire tree afaict:
> > 
> > arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c:     page = vmalloc_exec(PAGE_SIZE);
> > arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c:      hv_hypercall_pg = vmalloc_exec(PAGE_SIZE);
> > kernel/module.c:        return vmalloc_exec(size);
> > 
> > And that last one is a weak function that any arch that has STRICT_RWX
> > ought to override.
> > 
> > > We really shouldn't create mappings like this by default.  Either we
> > > need to flip PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC itself based on the needs of the above
> > > users, or add another define to overload vmalloc_exec as there is no
> > > other user of that for x86.
> > 
> > We really should get rid of the two !module users of this though; both
> > x86 and arm64 have STRICT_RWX and sufficient primitives to DTRT.
> > 
> > What is HV even trying to do with that page? AFAICT it never actually
> > writes to it, it seens to give the physica address to an MSR (which I
> > suspect then writes crud into the page for us from host context).
> > 
> > Suggesting the page really only needs to be RX.
> > 
> > On top of that, vmalloc_exec() gets us a page from the entire vmalloc
> > range, which can be outside of the 2G executable range, which seems to
> > suggest vmalloc_exec() is wrong too and all this works by accident.
> > 
> > How about something like this:
> > 
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
> > index a54c6a401581..82a3a4a9481f 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
> > @@ -375,12 +375,15 @@ void __init hyperv_init(void)
> >  	guest_id = generate_guest_id(0, LINUX_VERSION_CODE, 0);
> >  	wrmsrl(HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID, guest_id);
> >  
> > -	hv_hypercall_pg = vmalloc_exec(PAGE_SIZE);
> > +	hv_hypercall_pg = module_alloc(PAGE_SIZE);
> >  	if (hv_hypercall_pg == NULL) {
> >  		wrmsrl(HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID, 0);
> >  		goto remove_cpuhp_state;
> >  	}
> >  
> > +	set_memory_ro((unsigned long)hv_hypercall_pg, 1);
> > +	set_memory_x((unsigned long)hv_hypercall_pg, 1);
> 
> The changing of the permissions sucks.  I thought about adding
> a module_alloc_prot with an explicit pgprot_t argument.  On x86
> alone at least ftrace would also benefit from that.

The above is also missing a set_vm_flush_reset_perms.