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Message-ID: <20200617112222.GF4479@osiris>
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2020 13:22:22 +0200
From: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>
To: Pierre Morel <pmorel@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, pasic@...ux.ibm.com,
borntraeger@...ibm.com, frankja@...ux.ibm.com, mst@...hat.com,
jasowang@...hat.com, cohuck@...hat.com, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org, thomas.lendacky@....com,
david@...son.dropbear.id.au, linuxram@...ibm.com, gor@...ux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] s390: virtio: let arch accept devices without
IOMMU feature
On Wed, Jun 17, 2020 at 12:43:57PM +0200, Pierre Morel wrote:
> An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
> access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the
> use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
>
> Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices
> without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
>
> Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@...ux.ibm.com>
> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>
> Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>
> ---
> arch/s390/mm/init.c | 6 ++++++
> drivers/virtio/virtio.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/virtio.h | 2 ++
> 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/init.c b/arch/s390/mm/init.c
> index 6dc7c3b60ef6..215070c03226 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/mm/init.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/mm/init.c
> @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
> #include <asm/kasan.h>
> #include <asm/dma-mapping.h>
> #include <asm/uv.h>
> +#include <linux/virtio.h>
>
> pgd_t swapper_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD] __section(.bss..swapper_pg_dir);
>
> @@ -161,6 +162,11 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
> return is_prot_virt_guest();
> }
>
> +int arch_needs_virtio_iommu_platform(struct virtio_device *dev)
> +{
> + return is_prot_virt_guest();
> +}
> +
> /* protected virtualization */
> static void pv_init(void)
Can we please stop dumping random code to arch/s390/mm/init.c?
All the protected virtualization functions should go into a separate
file (e.g. mem_encrypt.c like on x86), some of which could also be in
header files.
Please consider this a comment for the future.. just go ahead with
this patch as-is.
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