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Message-ID: <20200618160133.937-3-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2020 18:01:25 +0200
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
To: <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, <mjg59@...gle.com>
CC: <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
<stable@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 03/11] evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if the HMAC key is loaded
Granting metadata write is safe if the HMAC key is not loaded, as it won't
let an attacker obtain a valid HMAC from corrupted xattrs. evm_write_key()
however does not allow it if any key is loaded, including a public key,
which should not be a problem.
This patch allows setting EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES if the EVM_INIT_HMAC
flag is not set.
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org # 4.16.x
Fixes: ae1ba1676b88e ("EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
---
security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index cfc3075769bb..92fe26ace797 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* keys are loaded.
*/
if ((i & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) &&
- ((evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK) != 0) &&
+ ((evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) != 0) &&
!(evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES))
return -EPERM;
--
2.17.1
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