linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.7 322/376] sparc64: fix misuses of access_process_vm() in genregs32

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Message-Id: <20200619141725.573811905@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Fri, 19 Jun 2020 16:34:00 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, stable@...nel.org,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 5.7 322/376] sparc64: fix misuses of access_process_vm() in genregs32_[sg]et()

From: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>

commit 142cd25293f6a7ecbdff4fb0af17de6438d46433 upstream.

We do need access_process_vm() to access the target's reg_window.
However, access to caller's memory (storing the result in
genregs32_get(), fetching the new values in case of genregs32_set())
should be done by normal uaccess primitives.

Fixes: ad4f95764040 ([SPARC64]: Fix user accesses in regset code.)
Cc: stable@...nel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_64.c |   17 +++--------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_64.c
@@ -572,19 +572,13 @@ static int genregs32_get(struct task_str
 			for (; count > 0 && pos < 32; count--) {
 				if (access_process_vm(target,
 						      (unsigned long)
-						      &reg_window[pos],
+						      &reg_window[pos++],
 						      &reg, sizeof(reg),
 						      FOLL_FORCE)
 				    != sizeof(reg))
 					return -EFAULT;
-				if (access_process_vm(target,
-						      (unsigned long) u,
-						      &reg, sizeof(reg),
-						      FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_WRITE)
-				    != sizeof(reg))
+				if (put_user(reg, u++))
 					return -EFAULT;
-				pos++;
-				u++;
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -684,12 +678,7 @@ static int genregs32_set(struct task_str
 			}
 		} else {
 			for (; count > 0 && pos < 32; count--) {
-				if (access_process_vm(target,
-						      (unsigned long)
-						      u,
-						      &reg, sizeof(reg),
-						      FOLL_FORCE)
-				    != sizeof(reg))
+				if (get_user(reg, u++))
 					return -EFAULT;
 				if (access_process_vm(target,
 						      (unsigned long)