linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.4 081/101] ima: Directly assign the ima_default_policy pointer to ima

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Message-Id: <20200619141618.229547024@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Fri, 19 Jun 2020 16:33:10 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Takashi Iwai <tiwai@...e.de>,
        Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 081/101] ima: Directly assign the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules

From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>

[ Upstream commit 067a436b1b0aafa593344fddd711a755a58afb3b ]

This patch prevents the following oops:

[   10.771813] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000
[...]
[   10.779790] RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0xf7/0xb80
[...]
[   10.798576] Call Trace:
[   10.798993]  ? ima_lsm_policy_change+0x2b0/0x2b0
[   10.799753]  ? inode_init_owner+0x1a0/0x1a0
[   10.800484]  ? _raw_spin_lock+0x7a/0xd0
[   10.801592]  ima_must_appraise.part.0+0xb6/0xf0
[   10.802313]  ? ima_fix_xattr.isra.0+0xd0/0xd0
[   10.803167]  ima_must_appraise+0x4f/0x70
[   10.804004]  ima_post_path_mknod+0x2e/0x80
[   10.804800]  do_mknodat+0x396/0x3c0

It occurs when there is a failure during IMA initialization, and
ima_init_policy() is not called. IMA hooks still call ima_match_policy()
but ima_rules is NULL. This patch prevents the crash by directly assigning
the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules when ima_rules is defined. This
wouldn't alter the existing behavior, as ima_rules is always set at the end
of ima_init_policy().

Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org # 3.7.x
Fixes: 07f6a79415d7d ("ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules")
Reported-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@...e.de>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 3997e206f82d..0ddc8cb6411b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
 
 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
 static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
-static struct list_head *ima_rules;
+static struct list_head *ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
 
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex);
 
@@ -412,7 +412,6 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 			      &ima_default_rules);
 	}
 
-	ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
 }
 
 /**
-- 
2.25.1