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Message-ID: <20200619132243.GC32683@zn.tnic>
Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2020 15:22:43 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Daniel Gutson <daniel@...ypsium.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Rob Herring <robh@...nel.org>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Rahul Tanwar <rahul.tanwar@...ux.intel.com>,
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Richard Hughes <hughsient@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Ability to read the MKTME status from userspace
On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 10:01:36AM -0300, Daniel Gutson wrote:
> Then the user will not know that he/she could improve the security of the
> system by enabling the feature in the BIOS.
And how is the user going to know from your "module"? AFAICT, your
module loads on any system - not only on ones which have MKTME in CPUID.
> The fact that the CPU has the cap and the BIOS disables it, can
> trigger a prevention action.
I can only venture guesses what "prevention action" is - you'll have to
be more verbose here.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
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