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Message-Id: <1592575449-64278-11-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2020 07:03:58 -0700
From: kan.liang@...ux.intel.com
To: peterz@...radead.org, mingo@...hat.com, acme@...nel.org,
tglx@...utronix.de, bp@...en8.de, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: mark.rutland@....com, alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com,
jolsa@...hat.com, namhyung@...nel.org, dave.hansen@...el.com,
yu-cheng.yu@...el.com, bigeasy@...utronix.de, gorcunov@...il.com,
hpa@...or.com, alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com, eranian@...gle.com,
ak@...ux.intel.com, like.xu@...ux.intel.com,
yao.jin@...ux.intel.com, Kan Liang <kan.liang@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 10/21] perf/x86/intel: Check Arch LBR MSRs
From: Kan Liang <kan.liang@...ux.intel.com>
The KVM may not support the MSRs of Architecture LBR. Accessing the
MSRs may cause #GP and crash the guest.
The MSRs have to be checked at guest boot time.
Only using the max number of Architecture LBR depth to check the
MSR_ARCH_LBR_DEPTH should be good enough. The max number can be
calculated by 8 * the position of the last set bit of LBR_DEPTH value
in CPUID enumeration.
Co-developed-by: Like Xu <like.xu@...ux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@...ux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@...ux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
index b236cff..c3372bd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
@@ -4145,6 +4145,8 @@ static bool check_msr(unsigned long msr, u64 mask)
if (is_lbr_from(msr))
val_tmp = lbr_from_signext_quirk_wr(val_tmp);
+ else if (msr == MSR_ARCH_LBR_DEPTH)
+ val_tmp = x86_pmu_get_max_arch_lbr_nr();
if (wrmsrl_safe(msr, val_tmp) ||
rdmsrl_safe(msr, &val_new))
@@ -5188,8 +5190,23 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
* Check all LBT MSR here.
* Disable LBR access if any LBR MSRs can not be accessed.
*/
- if (x86_pmu.lbr_nr && !check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_tos, 0x3UL))
- x86_pmu.lbr_nr = 0;
+ if (x86_pmu.lbr_nr) {
+ if (x86_pmu.arch_lbr) {
+ u64 mask = 1;
+
+ if (x86_pmu.arch_lbr_cpl)
+ mask |= ARCH_LBR_CTL_CPL;
+ if (x86_pmu.arch_lbr_filter)
+ mask |= ARCH_LBR_CTL_FILTER;
+ if (x86_pmu.arch_lbr_call_stack)
+ mask |= ARCH_LBR_CTL_STACK;
+ if (!check_msr(MSR_ARCH_LBR_CTL, mask))
+ x86_pmu.lbr_nr = 0;
+ if (!check_msr(MSR_ARCH_LBR_DEPTH, 0))
+ x86_pmu.lbr_nr = 0;
+ } else if (!check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_tos, 0x3UL))
+ x86_pmu.lbr_nr = 0;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < x86_pmu.lbr_nr; i++) {
if (!(check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_from + i, 0xffffUL) &&
check_msr(x86_pmu.lbr_to + i, 0xffffUL)))
@@ -5206,6 +5223,9 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
*/
if (x86_pmu.extra_regs) {
for (er = x86_pmu.extra_regs; er->msr; er++) {
+ /* Skip Arch LBR which is already verified */
+ if (x86_pmu.arch_lbr && (er->idx == EXTRA_REG_LBR))
+ continue;
er->extra_msr_access = check_msr(er->msr, 0x11UL);
/* Disable LBR select mapping */
if ((er->idx == EXTRA_REG_LBR) && !er->extra_msr_access)
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h b/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h
index cbfc55b..7112c51 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h
+++ b/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h
@@ -853,6 +853,11 @@ static inline bool x86_pmu_has_lbr_callstack(void)
x86_pmu.lbr_sel_map[PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CALL_STACK_SHIFT] > 0;
}
+static inline int x86_pmu_get_max_arch_lbr_nr(void)
+{
+ return fls(x86_pmu.arch_lbr_depth_mask) * 8;
+}
+
DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct cpu_hw_events, cpu_hw_events);
int x86_perf_event_set_period(struct perf_event *event);
--
2.7.4
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