linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] Ability to read the MKTME status from userspace

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Message-ID: <CAD2FfiF8QEarhyFD1GkfnaR+spyH86sChgRZm37ab_gzS2m_wg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 19 Jun 2020 15:36:28 +0100
From:   Richard Hughes <hughsient@...il.com>
To:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc:     Daniel Gutson <daniel@...ypsium.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Rob Herring <robh@...nel.org>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        Rahul Tanwar <rahul.tanwar@...ux.intel.com>,
        Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Ability to read the MKTME status from userspace

On Fri, 19 Jun 2020 at 15:23, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
> Last night, I asked my kids if they brushed their teeth.  They said:
> "Dad, my toothbrush was available."  They argued that mere availability
> was a better situation than not *having* a toothbrush.  They were
> logically right, of course, but they still got cavities.

I don't see how that's comparable, sorry. Surely Intel wants to sell
hardware advertising TME as a security feature?

> > So my take-away from that is that it's currently impossible to
> > actually say if your system is *actually* using TME.
> Not in a generic way, and it can't be derived from cpuid or MSRs alone.

Well, it seems not in any way at the moment.

> I'm pretty sure I'm using TME, but I didn't become sure from
> poking at sysfs.

How do you know that Lenovo didn't disable TME without looking at
dmesg? I don't think "pretty sure" is good enough when TME is
considered a security feature.

Richard