linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.19 011/267] lib: Reduce user_access_begin() boundaries in strncpy_from_user() and strnlen

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Message-Id: <20200619141649.402695278@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Fri, 19 Jun 2020 16:29:56 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@....fr>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Miles Chen <miles.chen@...iatek.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 011/267] lib: Reduce user_access_begin() boundaries in strncpy_from_user() and strnlen_user()

From: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@....fr>

commit ab10ae1c3bef56c29bac61e1201c752221b87b41 upstream.

The range passed to user_access_begin() by strncpy_from_user() and
strnlen_user() starts at 'src' and goes up to the limit of userspace
although reads will be limited by the 'count' param.

On 32 bits powerpc (book3s/32) access has to be granted for each
256Mbytes segment and the cost increases with the number of segments to
unlock.

Limit the range with 'count' param.

Fixes: 594cc251fdd0 ("make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@....fr>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Miles Chen <miles.chen@...iatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 lib/strncpy_from_user.c |   14 +++++++-------
 lib/strnlen_user.c      |   14 +++++++-------
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/lib/strncpy_from_user.c
+++ b/lib/strncpy_from_user.c
@@ -29,13 +29,6 @@ static inline long do_strncpy_from_user(
 	const struct word_at_a_time constants = WORD_AT_A_TIME_CONSTANTS;
 	unsigned long res = 0;
 
-	/*
-	 * Truncate 'max' to the user-specified limit, so that
-	 * we only have one limit we need to check in the loop
-	 */
-	if (max > count)
-		max = count;
-
 	if (IS_UNALIGNED(src, dst))
 		goto byte_at_a_time;
 
@@ -113,6 +106,13 @@ long strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const
 		unsigned long max = max_addr - src_addr;
 		long retval;
 
+		/*
+		 * Truncate 'max' to the user-specified limit, so that
+		 * we only have one limit we need to check in the loop
+		 */
+		if (max > count)
+			max = count;
+
 		kasan_check_write(dst, count);
 		check_object_size(dst, count, false);
 		if (user_access_begin(VERIFY_READ, src, max)) {
--- a/lib/strnlen_user.c
+++ b/lib/strnlen_user.c
@@ -32,13 +32,6 @@ static inline long do_strnlen_user(const
 	unsigned long c;
 
 	/*
-	 * Truncate 'max' to the user-specified limit, so that
-	 * we only have one limit we need to check in the loop
-	 */
-	if (max > count)
-		max = count;
-
-	/*
 	 * Do everything aligned. But that means that we
 	 * need to also expand the maximum..
 	 */
@@ -114,6 +107,13 @@ long strnlen_user(const char __user *str
 		unsigned long max = max_addr - src_addr;
 		long retval;
 
+		/*
+		 * Truncate 'max' to the user-specified limit, so that
+		 * we only have one limit we need to check in the loop
+		 */
+		if (max > count)
+			max = count;
+
 		if (user_access_begin(VERIFY_READ, str, max)) {
 			retval = do_strnlen_user(str, count, max);
 			user_access_end();