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Message-ID: <20200622192112.GB8956@glitch>
Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2020 16:21:12 -0300
From: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@...hat.com>
To: Nayna <nayna@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
zohar@...ux.ibm.com, erichte@...ux.ibm.com, nayna@...ux.ibm.com,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on
ARCH_POLICY to runtime
On Mon, Jun 22, 2020 at 03:01:27PM -0400, Nayna wrote:
>
> On 6/22/20 1:27 PM, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM has been marked as dependent on !IMA_ARCH_POLICY in
> > compile time, enforcing the appraisal whenever the kernel had the arch
> > policy option enabled.
> >
> > However it breaks systems where the option is actually set but the system
> > wasn't booted in a "secure boot" platform. In this scenario, anytime the
> > an appraisal policy (i.e. ima_policy=appraisal_tcb) is used it will be
> > forced, giving no chance to the user set the 'fix' state (ima_appraise=fix)
> > to actually measure system's files.
> >
> > This patch remove this compile time dependency and move it to a runtime
> > decision, based on the arch policy loading failure/success.
>
> Thanks for looking at this.
>
> For arch specific policies, kernel signature verification is enabled based
> on the secure boot state of the system. Perhaps, enforce the appraisal as
> well based on if secure boot is enabled.
>
> Thanks & Regards,
That's a good point.
I'm going to take another look and see where the check fits better and
come back with a new patch(set).
Thanks Nayna.
--
bmeneg
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