linux-kernel - [PATCH 07/12] ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an invalid cond

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Message-Id: <20200623003236.830149-8-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Date:   Mon, 22 Jun 2020 19:32:31 -0500
From:   Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>
Cc:     James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>,
        Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@...il.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 07/12] ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an invalid cond

The KEY_CHECK function only supports the uid, pcr, and keyrings
conditionals. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors
don't assume that other conditionals are supported.

Fixes: 5808611cccb2 ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 83975ad22907..e33347148aa9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1024,6 +1024,13 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
 				return false;
 
+			if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR |
+					     IMA_KEYRINGS))
+				return false;
+
+			if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+				return false;
+
 			break;
 		default:
 			return false;
-- 
2.25.1