linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.7 427/477] selinux: fix a double free in cond_read_node()/cond_read

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Message-Id: <20200623195427.714040921@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Tue, 23 Jun 2020 21:57:04 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Tom Rix <trix@...hat.com>,
        Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.7 427/477] selinux: fix a double free in cond_read_node()/cond_read_list()

From: Tom Rix <trix@...hat.com>

commit aa449a7965a6172a89d48844c313708962216f1f upstream.

Clang static analysis reports this double free error

security/selinux/ss/conditional.c:139:2: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc]
        kfree(node->expr.nodes);
        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

When cond_read_node fails, it calls cond_node_destroy which frees the
node but does not poison the entry in the node list.  So when it
returns to its caller cond_read_list, cond_read_list deletes the
partial list.  The latest entry in the list will be deleted twice.

So instead of freeing the node in cond_read_node, let list freeing in
code_read_list handle the freeing the problem node along with all of the
earlier nodes.

Because cond_read_node no longer does any error handling, the goto's
the error case are redundant.  Instead just return the error code.

Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Fixes: 60abd3181db2 ("selinux: convert cond_list to array")
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@...hat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 security/selinux/ss/conditional.c |   18 +++++-------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -392,27 +392,19 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policyd
 
 		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
 		if (rc)
-			goto err;
+			return rc;
 
 		expr->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 		expr->bool = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
 
-		if (!expr_node_isvalid(p, expr)) {
-			rc = -EINVAL;
-			goto err;
-		}
+		if (!expr_node_isvalid(p, expr))
+			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->true_list, NULL);
 	if (rc)
-		goto err;
-	rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, &node->true_list);
-	if (rc)
-		goto err;
-	return 0;
-err:
-	cond_node_destroy(node);
-	return rc;
+		return rc;
+	return cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, &node->true_list);
 }
 
 int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)