linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] MTE support for KVM guest

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Message-ID: <20200624110904.GB11863@gaia>
Date:   Wed, 24 Jun 2020 12:09:33 +0100
From:   Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
To:     Steven Price <steven.price@....com>
Cc:     Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@...aro.org>,
        Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>,
        lkml - Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu" <kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        arm-mail-list <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] MTE support for KVM guest

On Wed, Jun 24, 2020 at 12:03:35PM +0100, Steven Price wrote:
> On 24/06/2020 11:34, Dave Martin wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 24, 2020 at 10:38:48AM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > > On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 07:05:07PM +0100, Peter Maydell wrote:
> > > > On Wed, 17 Jun 2020 at 13:39, Steven Price <steven.price@....com> wrote:
> > > > > These patches add support to KVM to enable MTE within a guest. It is
> > > > > based on Catalin's v4 MTE user space series[1].
> > > > > 
> > > > > [1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200515171612.1020-1-catalin.marinas%40arm.com
> > > > > 
> > > > > Posting as an RFC as I'd like feedback on the approach taken.
> > > > 
> > > > What's your plan for handling tags across VM migration?
> > > > Will the kernel expose the tag ram to userspace so we
> > > > can copy it from the source machine to the destination
> > > > at the same time as we copy the actual ram contents ?
> > > 
> > > Qemu can map the guest memory with PROT_MTE and access the tags directly
> > > with LDG/STG instructions. Steven was actually asking in the cover
> > > letter whether we should require that the VMM maps the guest memory with
> > > PROT_MTE as a guarantee that it can access the guest tags.
> > > 
> > > There is no architecturally visible tag ram (tag storage), that's a
> > > microarchitecture detail.
> > 
> > If userspace maps the guest memory with PROT_MTE for dump purposes,
> > isn't it going to get tag check faults when accessing the memory
> > (i.e., when dumping the regular memory content, not the tags
> > specifically).
> > 
> > Does it need to map two aliases, one with PROT_MTE and one without,
> > and is that architecturally valid?
> 
> Userspace would either need to have two mappings (I don't believe there are
> any architectural issues with that - but this could be awkward to arrange in
> some situations) or be careful to avoid faults. Basically your choices with
> one mapping are:
> 
>  1. Disable tag checking (using prctl) when touching the memory. This works
> but means you lose tag checking for the VMM's own accesses during this code
> sequence.
> 
>  2. Read the tag values and ensure you use the correct tag. This suffers
> from race conditions if the VM is still running.
> 
>  3. Use one of the exceptions in the architecture that generates a Tag
> Unchecked access. Sadly the only remotely useful thing I can see in the v8
> ARM is "A base register plus immediate offset addressing form, with the SP
> as the base register." - but making sure SP is in range of where you want to
> access would be a pain.

Or:

4. Set PSTATE.TCO when accessing tagged memory in an unsafe way.

-- 
Catalin