linux-kernel - [PATCH ghak90 V9 08/13] audit: add containerid support for user records

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Message-Id: <4a5019ed3cfab416aeb6549b791ac6d8cc9fb8b7.1593198710.git.rgb@redhat.com>
Date:   Sat, 27 Jun 2020 09:20:41 -0400
From:   Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
To:     containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@...hat.com>,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, sgrubb@...hat.com,
        omosnace@...hat.com, dhowells@...hat.com, simo@...hat.com,
        eparis@...isplace.org, serge@...lyn.com, ebiederm@...ssion.com,
        nhorman@...driver.com, dwalsh@...hat.com, mpatel@...hat.com,
        Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH ghak90 V9 08/13] audit: add containerid support for user records

Add audit container identifier auxiliary record to user event standalone
records.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
---
 kernel/audit.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 54dd2cb69402..997c34178ee8 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1212,12 +1212,6 @@ static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_context *context,
 	audit_log_task_context(*ab);
 }
 
-static inline void audit_log_user_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab,
-					   u16 msg_type)
-{
-	audit_log_common_recv_msg(NULL, ab, msg_type);
-}
-
 int is_audit_feature_set(int i)
 {
 	return af.features & AUDIT_FEATURE_TO_MASK(i);
@@ -1486,6 +1480,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 		err = audit_filter(msg_type, AUDIT_FILTER_USER);
 		if (err == 1) { /* match or error */
 			char *str = data;
+			struct audit_context *context;
+			struct audit_contobj *cont;
 
 			err = 0;
 			if (msg_type == AUDIT_USER_TTY) {
@@ -1493,7 +1489,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 				if (err)
 					break;
 			}
-			audit_log_user_recv_msg(&ab, msg_type);
+			context = audit_alloc_local(GFP_KERNEL);
+			audit_log_common_recv_msg(context, &ab, msg_type);
 			if (msg_type != AUDIT_USER_TTY) {
 				/* ensure NULL termination */
 				str[data_len - 1] = '\0';
@@ -1507,6 +1504,14 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 				audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, str, data_len);
 			}
 			audit_log_end(ab);
+			rcu_read_lock();
+			cont = _audit_contobj_get(current);
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			audit_log_container_id(context, cont);
+			rcu_read_lock();
+			_audit_contobj_put(cont);
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			audit_free_context(context);
 		}
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
-- 
1.8.3.1