linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 4/5] kprobes: Do not expose probe addresses to non-CAP

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Message-ID: <202007021815.97C76C192@keescook>
Date:   Fri, 3 Jul 2020 08:13:24 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     Dominik Czarnota <dominik.czarnota@...ilofbits.com>,
        stable <stable@...r.kernel.org>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@...nel.org>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>,
        Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
        Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@...com>,
        KP Singh <kpsingh@...omium.org>,
        "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@...el.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@...il.com>,
        Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
        Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>,
        Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Matteo Croce <mcroce@...hat.com>,
        Edward Cree <ecree@...arflare.com>,
        Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@...nd.com>,
        Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@...nk.ru>,
        Thomas Richter <tmricht@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/5] kprobes: Do not expose probe addresses to
 non-CAP_SYSLOG

On Thu, Jul 02, 2020 at 06:00:17PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 2, 2020 at 4:26 PM Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> >
> > The kprobe show() functions were using "current"'s creds instead
> > of the file opener's creds for kallsyms visibility. Fix to use
> > seq_file->file->f_cred.
> 
> Side note: I have a distinct - but despite that possibly quite
> incorrect - memory that I've discussed with somebody several years ago
> about making "current_cred()" simply warn in any IO context.
> 
> IOW, we could have read and write just increment/decrement a
> per-thread counter, and have current_cred() do a WARN_ON_ONCE() if
> it's called with that counter incremented.

That does sound familiar. I can't find a thread on it, but my search
abilities are poor. :) So an increment/decrement in all the IO-related
syscalls, or were you thinking of some other location?

> The issue of ioctl's is a bit less obvious - there are reasons to
> argue those should also use open-time credentials, but on the other
> hand I think it's reasonable to pass a file descriptor to a suid app
> in order for that app to do things that the normal user cannot.
>
> But read/write are dangerous because of the "it's so easy to fool suid
> apps to read/write stdin/stdout".
>
> So pread/pwrite/ioctl/splice etc are things that suid applications
> very much do on purpose to affect a file descriptor. But plain
> read/write are things that might be accidental and used by attack
> vectors.

So probably just start with read/write and tighten it over time, if we
find other clear places, leaving ioctl/pread/pwrite/splice alone.

> If somebody is interested in looking into things like that, it might
> be a good idea to have kernel threads with that counter incremented by
> 
> Just throwing this idea out in case somebody wants to try it. It's not
> just "current_cred", of course. It's all the current_cred_xxx() users
> too. But it may be that there are a ton of false positives because
> maybe some code on purpose ends up doing things like just *comparing*
> current_cred with file->f_cred and then that would warn too.

Yeah ... and I think the kthread test should answer that question.

-- 
Kees Cook