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Message-ID: <20200704014349.GB129411@linux.intel.com>
Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2020 04:43:49 +0300
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@...ux.intel.com>,
Chunyang Hui <sanqian.hcy@...fin.com>,
Jordan Hand <jorhand@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@...hat.com>,
Seth Moore <sethmo@...gle.com>,
Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@...el.com>,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com,
asapek@...gle.com, cedric.xing@...el.com, chenalexchen@...gle.com,
conradparker@...gle.com, cyhanish@...gle.com,
dave.hansen@...el.com, haitao.huang@...el.com,
josh@...htriplett.org, kai.huang@...el.com, kai.svahn@...el.com,
kmoy@...gle.com, ludloff@...gle.com, luto@...nel.org,
nhorman@...hat.com, puiterwijk@...hat.com, rientjes@...gle.com,
tglx@...utronix.de, yaozhangx@...gle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v33 11/21] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 08:27:19AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Sat, Jun 27, 2020 at 07:43:35PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:08:33AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > +static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
> > > + void *token)
> > > +{
> > > + u64 mrsigner[4];
> > > + int ret;
> > > + int i;
> > > + int j;
> > > +
> > > + /* Check that the required attributes have been authorized. */
> > > + if (encl->secs_attributes & ~encl->allowed_attributes)
> > > + return -EACCES;
> > > +
> > > + ret = sgx_get_key_hash(sigstruct->modulus, mrsigner);
> > > + if (ret)
> > > + return ret;
> > > +
> > > + mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
> > > +
> > > + if (atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) {
> > > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > > + goto err_out;
> > > + }
> >
> > That test should be the first thing this function or its caller does.
>
> Hmm, I was going to say that SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED can't be checked until
> encl->lock is held, but that's not true for this path as mutual exclusion
> is provided by the SGX_ENCL_IOCTL flag. So yeah, this can be checked at
> the same time as SGX_ENCL_CREATED in sgx_ioc_enclave_init().
>
> > > + for (i = 0; i < SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT; i++) {
> > > + for (j = 0; j < SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT; j++) {
> >
> > Ew, what's that double-loop for?
> >
> > It tries to init an enclave a bunch of times. Why does it need to init
> > more than once?
>
> ENCLS[EINIT] is interruptible because it has such a high latency, e.g. 50k+
> cycles on success. If an IRQ/NMI/SMI becomes pending, EINIT may fail with
> SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT so that the event can be serviced.
>
> The idea behind the double loop is to try EINIT in a tight loop, then back
> off and sleep for a while before retrying that tight inner loop.
>
> > > + ret = sgx_einit(sigstruct, token, encl->secs.epc_page,
> > > + mrsigner);
> > > + if (ret == SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
> > > + continue;
> > > + else
> > > + break;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + if (ret != SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
> > > + break;
> > > +
> > > + msleep_interruptible(SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME);
> > > +
> > > + if (signal_pending(current)) {
> > > + ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
> > > + goto err_out;
> > > + }
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) {
> > > + if (encls_failed(ret))
> > > + ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EINIT");
> > > +
> > > + sgx_encl_destroy(encl);
> > > + ret = -EFAULT;
> > > + } else if (ret) {
> > > + pr_debug("EINIT returned %d\n", ret);
> > > + ret = -EPERM;
> > > + } else {
> > > + atomic_or(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags);
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > +err_out:
> > > + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
> > > + return ret;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +/**
> > > + * sgx_ioc_enclave_init - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT
> > > + *
> > > + * @filep: open file to /dev/sgx
> >
> > @encl: pointer to an enclave instance (via ioctl() file pointer)
> >
> > > + * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_init instance
> > > + *
> > > + * Flush any outstanding enqueued EADD operations and perform EINIT. The
> > > + * Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs are rewritten as necessary to match
> > > + * the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is caculated from the provided sigstruct.
> > > + *
> > > + * Return:
> > > + * 0 on success,
> > > + * SGX error code on EINIT failure,
> > > + * -errno otherwise
> > > + */
> > > +static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
> > > +{
> > > + struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct;
> > > + struct sgx_enclave_init einit;
> > > + struct page *initp_page;
> > > + void *token;
> > > + int ret;
> > > +
> > > + if (!(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
> >
> > Might just as well check the other flags: doing EINIT on an already
> > initialized enclave - SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED - is perhaps a nono or
> > similarly on a SGX_ENCL_DEAD enclave.
> >
> > And you could do similar sanity checks in the other ioctl functions.
>
> Ya, as above, SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED can be checked here.
>
> SGX_ENCL_DEAD is actually already checked in in the top level sgx_ioctl(),
> i.e. the check in sgx_encl_add_page() can technically be flat out dropped.
>
> I say "technically" because I'm a bit torn over SGX_ENCL_DEAD; encl->lock
> must be held to SGX_ENCL_DEAD (the page fault and reclaim flows rely on
> this), but as it stands today only ioctl() paths (guarded by SGX_ENCL_IOCTL)
> and sgx_release() (makes the ioctls() unreachable) set SGX_ENCL_DEAD.
>
> So it's safe to check SGX_ENCL_DEAD from ioctl() context without holding
> encl->lock, at least in the current code base, but it feels weird/sketchy.
>
> In the end I don't think I have a strong opinion. Removing the technically
> unnecessary DEAD check in sgx_encl_add_page() is the simplest change, so it
> may make sense to do that and nothing more for initial upstreaming. Long
> term, I fully expect we'll add paths that set SGX_ENCL_DEAD outside of
> ioctl() context, e.g. to handle EPC OOM, but it wouldn't be a bad thing to
> have a standalone commit in a future series to add DEAD checks (under
> encl->lock) in the ADD and INIT flows.
AFAIK nonne of th ioctl's should not need SGX_ENCL_DEAD check.
/Jarkko
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