[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20200706232309.12010-10-scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2020 16:23:09 -0700
From: Scott Branden <scott.branden@...adcom.com>
To: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
Wolfram Sang <wsa@...nel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
David Brown <david.brown@...aro.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, bjorn.andersson@...aro.org,
Shuah Khan <skhan@...uxfoundation.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
"Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-msm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
BCM Kernel Feedback <bcm-kernel-feedback-list@...adcom.com>,
Olof Johansson <olof@...om.net>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>,
Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@...e.de>, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
Andy Gross <agross@...nel.org>,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Scott Branden <scott.branden@...adcom.com>
Subject: [PATCH v10 9/9] ima: add FIRMWARE_PARTIAL_READ support
Add FIRMWARE_PARTIAL_READ support for integrity
measurement on partial reads of firmware files.
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@...adcom.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 15f29fed6d9f..04a431924265 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -611,6 +611,9 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
*/
int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
+ enum ima_hooks func;
+ u32 secid;
+
/*
* READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER
*
@@ -619,11 +622,27 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
* of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two
* buffers?
*/
- return 0;
+ if (read_id != READING_FIRMWARE_PARTIAL_READ)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!file) {
+ if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
+ (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
+ pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
+ return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+ 0, MAY_READ, func);
}
const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
[READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
+ [READING_FIRMWARE_PARTIAL_READ] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
[READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
[READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
[READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
@@ -650,6 +669,9 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum ima_hooks func;
u32 secid;
+ if (read_id == READING_FIRMWARE_PARTIAL_READ)
+ return 0;
+
if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
--
2.17.1
Powered by blists - more mailing lists