linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 18/18] arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CLANG

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Message-ID: <20200706160023.GB10992@arm.com>
Date:   Mon, 6 Jul 2020 17:00:23 +0100
From:   Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>
To:     Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
Cc:     Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
        virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Alan Stern <stern@...land.harvard.edu>,
        Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>,
        Matt Turner <mattst88@...il.com>, kernel-team@...roid.com,
        Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
        Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@...il.com>,
        Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
        Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@...assic.park.msu.ru>,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        Richard Henderson <rth@...ddle.net>,
        Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-alpha@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 18/18] arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when
 CLANG_LTO=y

On Thu, Jul 02, 2020 at 08:23:02AM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 01, 2020 at 06:07:25PM +0100, Dave P Martin wrote:
> > On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 06:37:34PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> > > When building with LTO, there is an increased risk of the compiler
> > > converting an address dependency headed by a READ_ONCE() invocation
> > > into a control dependency and consequently allowing for harmful
> > > reordering by the CPU.
> > > 
> > > Ensure that such transformations are harmless by overriding the generic
> > > READ_ONCE() definition with one that provides acquire semantics when
> > > building with LTO.
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
> > > ---
> > >  arch/arm64/include/asm/rwonce.h   | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > >  arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile   |  2 +-
> > >  arch/arm64/kernel/vdso32/Makefile |  2 +-
> > >  3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > >  create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/rwonce.h
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/rwonce.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/rwonce.h
> > > new file mode 100644
> > > index 000000000000..515e360b01a1
> > > --- /dev/null
> > > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/rwonce.h
> > > @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
> > > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> > > +/*
> > > + * Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC.
> > > + */
> > > +#ifndef __ASM_RWONCE_H
> > > +#define __ASM_RWONCE_H
> > > +
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_CLANG_LTO
> > 
> > Don't we have a generic option for LTO that's not specific to Clang.
> 
> /me looks at the LTO series some more
> 
> Oh yeah, there's CONFIG_LTO which is selected by CONFIG_LTO_CLANG, which is
> the non-typoed version of the above. I can switch this to CONFIG_LTO.
> 
> > Also, can you illustrate code that can only be unsafe with Clang LTO?
> 
> I don't have a concrete example, but it's an ongoing concern over on the LTO
> thread [1], so I cooked this to show one way we could deal with it. The main
> concern is that the whole-program optimisations enabled by LTO may allow the
> compiler to enumerate possible values for a pointer at link time and replace
> an address dependency between two loads with a control dependency instead,
> defeating the dependency ordering within the CPU.

Why can't that happen without LTO?

> We likely won't realise if/when this goes wrong, other than impossible to
> debug, subtle breakage that crops up seemingly randomly. Ideally, we'd be
> able to detect this sort of thing happening at build time, and perhaps
> even prevent it with compiler options or annotations, but none of that is
> close to being available and I'm keen to progress the LTO patches in the
> meantime because they are a requirement for CFI.

My concern was not so much why LTO makes things dangerous, as why !LTO
makes things safe...

Cheers
---Dave