linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 09/11] ima: Move validation of the keyrings conditional into ima_validate

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Mon, 06 Jul 2020 23:18:45 -0400
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com>
Cc:     Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>,
        Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@...il.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 09/11] ima: Move validation of the keyrings
 conditional into ima_validate_rule()

On Mon, 2020-07-06 at 08:18 -0500, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> On 2020-07-03 10:15:32, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Thu, 2020-07-02 at 17:16 -0500, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> > > On 2020-06-30 19:07:29, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > > On Fri, 2020-06-26 at 17:38 -0500, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> > > > > Use ima_validate_rule() to ensure that the combination of a hook
> > > > > function and the keyrings conditional is valid and that the keyrings
> > > > > conditional is not specified without an explicit KEY_CHECK func
> > > > > conditional. This is a code cleanup and has no user-facing change.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com>
> > > > > ---
> > > > > 
> > > > > * v2
> > > > >   - Allowed IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED, IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO,
> > > > >     IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED, and IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST conditionals to be
> > > > >     present in the rule entry flags for non-buffer hook functions.
> > > > > 
> > > > >  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 13 +++++++++++--
> > > > >  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > > > > 
> > > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > > > > index 8cdca2399d59..43d49ad958fb 100644
> > > > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > > > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > > > > @@ -1000,6 +1000,15 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> > > > >  		case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
> > > > >  		case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
> > > > >  		case POLICY_CHECK:
> > > > > +			if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_FSMAGIC |
> > > > > +					     IMA_UID | IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID |
> > > > > +					     IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR |
> > > > > +					     IMA_FSNAME | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
> > > > > +					     IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO |
> > > > > +					     IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED |
> > > > > +					     IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST))
> > > > 
> > > > Other than KEYRINGS, this patch should continue to behave the same.
> > > >  However, this list gives the impressions that all of these flags are
> > > > permitted on all of the above flags, which isn't true.
> > > > 
> > > > For example, both IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST are limited
> > > > to appended signatures, meaning KERNEL_CHECK and KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK.
> > > 
> > > Just to clarify, are both IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED and IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST
> > > limited to KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, and MODULE_CHECK?
> > > That's what ima_hook_supports_modsig() suggests.
> > 
> > Theoretically that is true, but I have no idea how you would append a
> > signature to the kexec boot command line.  The only users of appended
> > signatures are currently kernel modules and the kexec'ed kernel image.
> 
> The discrepancy was with KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, not KEXEC_CMDLINE. I now
> see that there's no support for initramfs signature verification in the
> kexec code so I'll assume that ima_hook_supports_modsig() is wrong and
> limit IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED and IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST to the
> KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and MODULE_CHECK actions, as you originally
> suggested.

My mistake.  Yes, both the kexec kernel image and the initramfs read
the respective file into memory and can be signed either with an
imasig or modsig.  Refer to kernel_read_file_from_fd().

Mimi