lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:   Tue, 7 Jul 2020 16:01:28 -0700
From:   Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>
To:     "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>,
        Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
Cc:     Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
        virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        Alan Stern <stern@...land.harvard.edu>,
        Matt Turner <mattst88@...il.com>,
        kernel-team <kernel-team@...roid.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@...il.com>,
        Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
        Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@...assic.park.msu.ru>,
        Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        Richard Henderson <rth@...ddle.net>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-alpha@...r.kernel.org,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 18/18] arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CLANG_LTO=y

I'm trying to put together a Micro Conference for Linux Plumbers
conference focused on "make LLVM slightly less shitty."  Do you all
plan on attending the conference? Would it be worthwhile to hold a
session focused on discussing this (LTO and memory models) be
worthwhile?


On Tue, Jul 7, 2020 at 3:51 PM Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@...nel.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jul 07, 2020 at 11:29:15AM +0100, Dave Martin wrote:
> > On Mon, Jul 06, 2020 at 10:36:28AM -0700, Paul E. McKenney wrote:
> > > On Mon, Jul 06, 2020 at 06:05:57PM +0100, Dave Martin wrote:
>
> [ . . . ]
>
> > > > The underlying problem here seems to be that the necessary ordering
> > > > rule is not part of what passes for the C memory model prior to C11.
> > > > If we want to control the data flow, don't we have to wrap the entire
> > > > dereference in a macro?
> > >
> > > Yes, exactly.  Because we are relying on things that are not guaranteed
> > > by the C memory model, we need to pay attention to the implementations.
> > > As I have said elsewhere, the price of control dependencies is eternal
> > > vigilance.
> > >
> > > And this also applies, to a lesser extent, to address and data
> > > dependencies, which are also not well supported by the C standard.
> > >
> > > There is one important case in which the C memory model -does- support
> > > control dependencies, and that is when the dependent write is a normal
> > > C-language write that is not involved in a data race.  In that case,
> > > if the compiler broke the control dependency, it might have introduced
> > > a data race, which it is forbidden to do.  However, this rule can also
> > > be broken when the compiler knows too much, as it might be able to prove
> > > that breaking the dependency won't introduce a data race.  In that case,
> > > according to the standard, it is free to break the dependency.
> >
> > Which only matters because the C abstract machine may not match reality.
> >
> > LTO has no bearing on the abstract machine though.
> >
> > If specific compiler options etc. can be added to inhibit the
> > problematic optimisations, that would be ideal.  I guess that can't
> > happen overnight though.
>
> Sadly, I must agree.
>
> > > > > > > We likely won't realise if/when this goes wrong, other than impossible to
> > > > > > > debug, subtle breakage that crops up seemingly randomly. Ideally, we'd be
> > > > > > > able to detect this sort of thing happening at build time, and perhaps
> > > > > > > even prevent it with compiler options or annotations, but none of that is
> > > > > > > close to being available and I'm keen to progress the LTO patches in the
> > > > > > > meantime because they are a requirement for CFI.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > My concern was not so much why LTO makes things dangerous, as why !LTO
> > > > > > makes things safe...
> > > > >
> > > > > Because ignorant compilers are safe compilers!  ;-)
> > > >
> > > > AFAICT ignorance is no gurantee of ordering in general -- the compiler
> > > > is free to speculatively invent knowledge any place that the language
> > > > spec allows it to.  !LTO doesn't stop this happening.
> > >
> > > Agreed, according to the standard, the compiler has great freedom.
> > >
> > > We have two choices: (1) Restrict ourselves to live within the confines of
> > > the standard or (2) Pay continued close attention to the implementation.
> > > We have made different choices at different times, but for many ordering
> > > situations we have gone with door #2.
> > >
> > > Me, I have been working to get the standard to better support our
> > > use case.  This is at best slow going.  But don't take my word for it,
> > > ask Will.
> >
> > I can believe it.  They want to enable optimisations rather than prevent
> > them...
>
> Right in one!  ;-)
>
> > > > Hopefully some of the knowledge I invented in my reply is valid...
> > >
> > > It is.  It is just that there are multiple valid strategies, and the
> > > Linux kernel is currently taking a mixed-strategy approach.
> >
> > Ack.  The hope that there is a correct way to fix everything dies
> > hard ;)
>
> Either that, or one slowly degrades ones definition of "correct".  :-/
>
> > Life was cosier before I started trying to reason about language specs.
>
> Same here!
>
>                                                         Thanx, Paul



-- 
Thanks,
~Nick Desaulniers

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ