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Message-ID: <2c05c0c3-e72a-7cc6-3391-2e0d3bdf6b2c@al2klimov.de>
Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2020 20:22:03 +0200
From: "Alexander A. Klimov" <grandmaster@...klimov.de>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: corbet@....net, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: YAMA SECURITY MODULE
Am 08.07.20 um 10:05 schrieb Kees Cook:
> On Wed, Jul 08, 2020 at 09:33:46AM +0200, Alexander A. Klimov wrote:
>> Rationale:
>> Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
>> as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.
>>
>> Deterministic algorithm:
>> For each file:
>> If not .svg:
>> For each line:
>> If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`:
>> For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`:
>> If neither `\bgnu\.org/license`, nor `\bmozilla\.org/MPL\b`:
>> If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions
>> return 200 OK and serve the same content:
>> Replace HTTP with HTTPS.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@...klimov.de>
>> ---
>> Continuing my work started at 93431e0607e5.
>> See also: git log --oneline '--author=Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@...klimov.de>' v5.7..master
>> (Actually letting a shell for loop submit all this stuff for me.)
>>
>> If there are any URLs to be removed completely or at least not HTTPSified:
>> Just clearly say so and I'll *undo my change*.
As written here...
>> See also: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/6/27/64
>>
>> If there are any valid, but yet not changed URLs:
>> See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/6/26/837
>>
>> If you apply the patch, please let me know.
>>
>>
>> Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst | 2 +-
>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst
>> index d0a060de3973..64fd62507ae5 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst
>> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst
>> @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ of their attack without resorting to user-assisted phishing.
>>
>> This is not a theoretical problem. SSH session hijacking
>> (http://www.storm.net.nz/projects/7) and arbitrary code injection
>
> This link is dead. It is likely best replaced by:
... I'd undo this change.
But as it's the only one here, just forget this patch.
> https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf
> (this is the same person, but it seems storm.net.nz is gone)
>
>> -(http://c-skills.blogspot.com/2007/05/injectso.html) attacks already
>> +(https://c-skills.blogspot.com/2007/05/injectso.html) attacks already
>> exist and remain possible if ptrace is allowed to operate as before.
>> Since ptrace is not commonly used by non-developers and non-admins, system
>> builders should be allowed the option to disable this debugging system.
>
> With that change:
>
> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>
> for the docs tree.
>
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