[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <MWHPR11MB16456D12135AA36BA16CE4208C640@MWHPR11MB1645.namprd11.prod.outlook.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2020 01:56:48 +0000
From: "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@...el.com>
To: "Liu, Yi L" <yi.l.liu@...el.com>,
Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>,
"jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com" <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>
CC: "eric.auger@...hat.com" <eric.auger@...hat.com>,
"baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com" <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>,
"joro@...tes.org" <joro@...tes.org>,
"Raj, Ashok" <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
"Tian, Jun J" <jun.j.tian@...el.com>,
"Sun, Yi Y" <yi.y.sun@...el.com>,
"jean-philippe@...aro.org" <jean-philippe@...aro.org>,
"peterx@...hat.com" <peterx@...hat.com>,
"Wu, Hao" <hao.wu@...el.com>,
"iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org" <iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
"kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v3 06/14] vfio/type1: Add VFIO_IOMMU_PASID_REQUEST
(alloc/free)
> From: Liu, Yi L <yi.l.liu@...el.com>
> Sent: Thursday, July 9, 2020 8:32 AM
>
> Hi Alex,
>
> > Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>
> > Sent: Thursday, July 9, 2020 3:55 AM
> >
> > On Wed, 8 Jul 2020 08:16:16 +0000
> > "Liu, Yi L" <yi.l.liu@...el.com> wrote:
> >
> > > Hi Alex,
> > >
> > > > From: Liu, Yi L < yi.l.liu@...el.com>
> > > > Sent: Friday, July 3, 2020 2:28 PM
> > > >
> > > > Hi Alex,
> > > >
> > > > > From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>
> > > > > Sent: Friday, July 3, 2020 5:19 AM
> > > > >
> > > > > On Wed, 24 Jun 2020 01:55:19 -0700
> > > > > Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@...el.com> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > This patch allows user space to request PASID allocation/free, e.g.
> > > > > > when serving the request from the guest.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > PASIDs that are not freed by userspace are automatically freed
> when
> > > > > > the IOASID set is destroyed when process exits.
> > > [...]
> > > > > > +static int vfio_iommu_type1_pasid_request(struct vfio_iommu
> *iommu,
> > > > > > + unsigned long arg)
> > > > > > +{
> > > > > > + struct vfio_iommu_type1_pasid_request req;
> > > > > > + unsigned long minsz;
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_iommu_type1_pasid_request,
> > range);
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + if (copy_from_user(&req, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
> > > > > > + return -EFAULT;
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + if (req.argsz < minsz || (req.flags &
> > ~VFIO_PASID_REQUEST_MASK))
> > > > > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + if (req.range.min > req.range.max)
> > > > >
> > > > > Is it exploitable that a user can spin the kernel for a long time in
> > > > > the case of a free by calling this with [0, MAX_UINT] regardless of their
> > actual
> > > > allocations?
> > > >
> > > > IOASID can ensure that user can only free the PASIDs allocated to the
> user.
> > but
> > > > it's true, kernel needs to loop all the PASIDs within the range provided
> > > > by user.
> > it
> > > > may take a long time. is there anything we can do? one thing may limit
> the
> > range
> > > > provided by user?
> > >
> > > thought about it more, we have per-VM pasid quota (say 1000), so even if
> > > user passed down [0, MAX_UNIT], kernel will only loop the 1000 pasids at
> > > most. do you think we still need to do something on it?
> >
> > How do you figure that? vfio_iommu_type1_pasid_request() accepts the
> > user's min/max so long as (max > min) and passes that to
> > vfio_iommu_type1_pasid_free(), then to vfio_pasid_free_range() which
> > loops as:
> >
> > ioasid_t pasid = min;
> > for (; pasid <= max; pasid++)
> > ioasid_free(pasid);
> >
> > A user might only be able to allocate 1000 pasids, but apparently they
> > can ask to free all they want.
> >
> > It's also not obvious to me that calling ioasid_free() is only allowing
> > the user to free their own passid. Does it? It would be a pretty
Agree. I thought ioasid_free should at least carry a token since the
user space is only allowed to manage PASIDs in its own set...
> > gaping hole if a user could free arbitrary pasids. A r-b tree of
> > passids might help both for security and to bound spinning in a loop.
>
> oh, yes. BTW. instead of r-b tree in VFIO, maybe we can add an ioasid_set
> parameter for ioasid_free(), thus to prevent the user from freeing PASIDs
> that doesn't belong to it. I remember Jacob mentioned it before.
>
check current ioasid_free:
spin_lock(&ioasid_allocator_lock);
ioasid_data = xa_load(&active_allocator->xa, ioasid);
if (!ioasid_data) {
pr_err("Trying to free unknown IOASID %u\n", ioasid);
goto exit_unlock;
}
Allow an user to trigger above lock paths with MAX_UINT times might still
be bad.
Thanks
Kevin
Powered by blists - more mailing lists