linux-kernel - RE: [PATCH v3 06/14] vfio/type1: Add VFIO_IOMMU_PASID

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Date:   Thu, 9 Jul 2020 02:26:27 +0000
From:   "Liu, Yi L" <yi.l.liu@...el.com>
To:     "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@...el.com>,
        Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>,
        "jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com" <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>
CC:     "eric.auger@...hat.com" <eric.auger@...hat.com>,
        "baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com" <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>,
        "joro@...tes.org" <joro@...tes.org>,
        "Raj, Ashok" <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
        "Tian, Jun J" <jun.j.tian@...el.com>,
        "Sun, Yi Y" <yi.y.sun@...el.com>,
        "jean-philippe@...aro.org" <jean-philippe@...aro.org>,
        "peterx@...hat.com" <peterx@...hat.com>,
        "Wu, Hao" <hao.wu@...el.com>,
        "iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org" <iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
        "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v3 06/14] vfio/type1: Add VFIO_IOMMU_PASID_REQUEST
 (alloc/free)

Hi Kevin,

> From: Tian, Kevin <kevin.tian@...el.com>
> Sent: Thursday, July 9, 2020 10:18 AM
> 
> > From: Liu, Yi L <yi.l.liu@...el.com>
> > Sent: Thursday, July 9, 2020 10:08 AM
> >
> > Hi Kevin,
> >
> > > From: Tian, Kevin <kevin.tian@...el.com>
> > > Sent: Thursday, July 9, 2020 9:57 AM
> > >
> > > > From: Liu, Yi L <yi.l.liu@...el.com>
> > > > Sent: Thursday, July 9, 2020 8:32 AM
> > > >
> > > > Hi Alex,
> > > >
> > > > > Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>
> > > > > Sent: Thursday, July 9, 2020 3:55 AM
> > > > >
> > > > > On Wed, 8 Jul 2020 08:16:16 +0000
> > > > > "Liu, Yi L" <yi.l.liu@...el.com> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Hi Alex,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > From: Liu, Yi L < yi.l.liu@...el.com>
> > > > > > > Sent: Friday, July 3, 2020 2:28 PM
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Hi Alex,
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>
> > > > > > > > Sent: Friday, July 3, 2020 5:19 AM
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > On Wed, 24 Jun 2020 01:55:19 -0700 Liu Yi L
> > > > > > > > <yi.l.liu@...el.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > This patch allows user space to request PASID allocation/free,
> > e.g.
> > > > > > > > > when serving the request from the guest.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > PASIDs that are not freed by userspace are automatically
> > > > > > > > > freed
> > > > when
> > > > > > > > > the IOASID set is destroyed when process exits.
> > > > > > [...]
> > > > > > > > > +static int vfio_iommu_type1_pasid_request(struct vfio_iommu
> > > > *iommu,
> > > > > > > > > +					  unsigned long arg)
> > > > > > > > > +{
> > > > > > > > > +	struct vfio_iommu_type1_pasid_request req;
> > > > > > > > > +	unsigned long minsz;
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > +	minsz = offsetofend(struct
> vfio_iommu_type1_pasid_request,
> > > > > range);
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > +	if (copy_from_user(&req, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
> > > > > > > > > +		return -EFAULT;
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > +	if (req.argsz < minsz || (req.flags &
> > > > > ~VFIO_PASID_REQUEST_MASK))
> > > > > > > > > +		return -EINVAL;
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > +	if (req.range.min > req.range.max)
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Is it exploitable that a user can spin the kernel for a long
> > > > > > > > time in the case of a free by calling this with [0, MAX_UINT]
> > > > > > > > regardless of their
> > > > > actual
> > > > > > > allocations?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > IOASID can ensure that user can only free the PASIDs allocated
> > > > > > > to the
> > > > user.
> > > > > but
> > > > > > > it's true, kernel needs to loop all the PASIDs within the range
> > > > > > > provided by user.
> > > > > it
> > > > > > > may take a long time. is there anything we can do? one thing may
> > > > > > > limit
> > > > the
> > > > > range
> > > > > > > provided by user?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > thought about it more, we have per-VM pasid quota (say 1000), so
> > > > > > even if user passed down [0, MAX_UNIT], kernel will only loop the
> > > > > > 1000 pasids at most. do you think we still need to do something on it?
> > > > >
> > > > > How do you figure that?  vfio_iommu_type1_pasid_request() accepts
> > > > > the user's min/max so long as (max > min) and passes that to
> > > > > vfio_iommu_type1_pasid_free(), then to vfio_pasid_free_range()
> > > > > which loops as:
> > > > >
> > > > > 	ioasid_t pasid = min;
> > > > > 	for (; pasid <= max; pasid++)
> > > > > 		ioasid_free(pasid);
> > > > >
> > > > > A user might only be able to allocate 1000 pasids, but apparently
> > > > > they can ask to free all they want.
> > > > >
> > > > > It's also not obvious to me that calling ioasid_free() is only
> > > > > allowing the user to free their own passid.  Does it?  It would be a
> > > > > pretty
> > >
> > > Agree. I thought ioasid_free should at least carry a token since the user
> > space is
> > > only allowed to manage PASIDs in its own set...
> > >
> > > > > gaping hole if a user could free arbitrary pasids.  A r-b tree of
> > > > > passids might help both for security and to bound spinning in a loop.
> > > >
> > > > oh, yes. BTW. instead of r-b tree in VFIO, maybe we can add an
> > > > ioasid_set parameter for ioasid_free(), thus to prevent the user from
> > > > freeing PASIDs that doesn't belong to it. I remember Jacob mentioned it
> > before.
> > > >
> > >
> > > check current ioasid_free:
> > >
> > >         spin_lock(&ioasid_allocator_lock);
> > >         ioasid_data = xa_load(&active_allocator->xa, ioasid);
> > >         if (!ioasid_data) {
> > >                 pr_err("Trying to free unknown IOASID %u\n", ioasid);
> > >                 goto exit_unlock;
> > >         }
> > >
> > > Allow an user to trigger above lock paths with MAX_UINT times might still
> > be bad.
> >
> > yeah, how about the below two options:
> >
> > - comparing the max - min with the quota before calling ioasid_free().
> >   If max - min > current quota of the user, then should fail it. If
> >   max - min < quota, then call ioasid_free() one by one. still trigger
> >   the above lock path with quota times.
> 
> This is definitely wrong. [min, max] is about the range of the PASID value,
> while quota is about the number of allocated PASIDs. It's a bit weird to
> mix two together.

got it.

> btw what is the main purpose of allowing batch PASID
> free requests? Can we just simplify to allow one PASID in each free just
> like how is it done in allocation path?

it's an intention to reuse the [min, max] range as allocation path. currently,
we don't have such request as far as I can see.

> >
> > - pass the max and min to ioasid_free(), let ioasid_free() decide. should
> >   be able to avoid trigger the lock multiple times, and ioasid has have a
> >   track on how may PASIDs have been allocated, if max - min is larger than
> >   the allocated number, should fail anyway.
> 
> What about Alex's r-b tree suggestion? Is there any downside in you mind?

no downside, I was just wanting to reuse the tracks in ioasid_set. I can add
a r-b for allocated PASIDs and find the PASIDs in the r-b tree only do free
for the PASIDs found in r-b tree, others in the range would be ignored.
does it look good?

Regards,
Yi Liu

> Thanks,
> Kevin