linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v5] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH

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Message-ID: <20200710180338.GA10547@glitch>
Date:   Fri, 10 Jul 2020 15:03:38 -0300
From:   Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@...hat.com>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, erichte@...ux.ibm.com,
        nayna@...ux.ibm.com, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on
 ARCH_POLICY to runtime

On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 01:23:24PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2020-07-09 at 13:46 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
> > APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM has been marked as dependent on !ARCH_POLICY in compile
> > time, enforcing the appraisal whenever the kernel had the arch policy option
> > enabled.
> 
> > However it breaks systems where the option is set but the system didn't
> > boot in a "secure boot" platform. In this scenario, anytime an appraisal
> > policy (i.e. ima_policy=appraisal_tcb) is used it will be forced, without
> > giving the user the opportunity to label the filesystem, before enforcing
> > integrity.
> > 
> > Considering the ARCH_POLICY is only effective when secure boot is actually
> > enabled this patch remove the compile time dependency and move it to a
> > runtime decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
> 
> Perhaps we could simplify this patch description a bit?
> 
> The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different
> "ima_appraise=" modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when
> IMA architecture specific policies are enabled.  This prevents
> properly labeling the filesystem on systems where secure boot is
> supported, but not enabled on the platform.  Only when secure boot is
> enabled, should these IMA appraise modes be disabled.
> 
> This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
> decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
> 

Sounds good to me.

> <snip>
> 
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > index a9649b04b9f1..884de471b38a 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> > @@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
> >  static int __init default_appraise_setup(c
> 
> > har *str)
> >  {
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
> > +	if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> > +		pr_info("appraise boot param ignored: secure boot enabled");
> 
> Instead of a generic statement, is it possible to include the actual
> option being denied?  Perhaps something like: "Secure boot enabled,
> ignoring %s boot command line option"
> 
> Mimi
> 

Yes, sure.

Thanks!

> > +		return 1;
> > +	}
> > +
> >  	if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
> >  		ima_appraise = 0;
> >  	else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
> 

-- 
bmeneg 
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