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Message-ID: <CAJF2gTQQerCP0i1zsj28wP+r9mjsV1wU_ssWASbNWuhK9UgbtA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 13 Jul 2020 12:05:33 +0800
From:   Guo Ren <guoren@...nel.org>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@...gle.com>,
        Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
        Anup Patel <anup@...infault.org>,
        Greentime Hu <greentime.hu@...ive.com>,
        Zong Li <zong.li@...ive.com>,
        Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@...il.com>,
        Atish Patra <atish.patra@....com>, cooper.qu@...ux.alibaba.com,
        linux-riscv <linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-csky@...r.kernel.org, Guo Ren <guoren@...ux.alibaba.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] riscv: Enable per-task stack canaries

Hi Kees,

On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 10:40 AM Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 04:19:58PM +0000, guoren@...nel.org wrote:
> > From: Guo Ren <guoren@...ux.alibaba.com>
> >
> > This enables the use of per-task stack canary values if GCC has
> > support for emitting the stack canary reference relative to the
> > value of tp, which holds the task struct pointer in the riscv
> > kernel.
> >
> > After compare arm64 and x86 implementations, seems arm64's is more
> > flexible and readable. The key point is how gcc get the offset of
> > stack_canary from gs/el0_sp.
> >
> > x86: Use a fix offset from gs, not flexible.
> >
> > struct fixed_percpu_data {
> >       /*
> >        * GCC hardcodes the stack canary as %gs:40.  Since the
> >        * irq_stack is the object at %gs:0, we reserve the bottom
> >        * 48 bytes of the irq stack for the canary.
> >        */
> >       char            gs_base[40]; // :(
> >       unsigned long   stack_canary;
> > };
> >
> > arm64: Use -mstack-protector-guard-offset & guard-reg
> >       gcc options:
> >       -mstack-protector-guard=sysreg
> >       -mstack-protector-guard-reg=sp_el0
> >       -mstack-protector-guard-offset=xxx
> >
> > riscv: Use -mstack-protector-guard-offset & guard-reg
> >       gcc options:
> >       -mstack-protector-guard=tls
> >       -mstack-protector-guard-reg=tp
> >       -mstack-protector-guard-offset=xxx
> >
> > Here is riscv gcc's work [1].
> >
> > [1] https://gcc.gnu.org/pipermail/gcc-patches/2020-July/549583.html
> >
> > In the end, these codes are inserted by gcc before return:
> >
> > *  0xffffffe00020b396 <+120>:   ld      a5,1008(tp) # 0x3f0
> > *  0xffffffe00020b39a <+124>:   xor     a5,a5,a4
> > *  0xffffffe00020b39c <+126>:   mv      a0,s5
> > *  0xffffffe00020b39e <+128>:   bnez    a5,0xffffffe00020b61c <_do_fork+766>
> >    0xffffffe00020b3a2 <+132>:   ld      ra,136(sp)
> >    0xffffffe00020b3a4 <+134>:   ld      s0,128(sp)
> >    0xffffffe00020b3a6 <+136>:   ld      s1,120(sp)
> >    0xffffffe00020b3a8 <+138>:   ld      s2,112(sp)
> >    0xffffffe00020b3aa <+140>:   ld      s3,104(sp)
> >    0xffffffe00020b3ac <+142>:   ld      s4,96(sp)
> >    0xffffffe00020b3ae <+144>:   ld      s5,88(sp)
> >    0xffffffe00020b3b0 <+146>:   ld      s6,80(sp)
> >    0xffffffe00020b3b2 <+148>:   ld      s7,72(sp)
> >    0xffffffe00020b3b4 <+150>:   addi    sp,sp,144
> >    0xffffffe00020b3b6 <+152>:   ret
> >    ...
> > *  0xffffffe00020b61c <+766>:   auipc   ra,0x7f8
> > *  0xffffffe00020b620 <+770>:   jalr    -1764(ra) # 0xffffffe000a02f38 <__stack_chk_fail>
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@...ux.alibaba.com>
> > Signed-off-by: cooper <cooper.qu@...ux.alibaba.com>
> > Cc: cooper <cooper.qu@...ux.alibaba.com>
> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> > ---
> > Change v2:
> >  - Change to -mstack-protector-guard=tls for gcc final define
> >  - Solve compile error by changing position of KBUILD_CFLAGS in
> >    Makefile
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@...ux.alibaba.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/riscv/Kconfig                      |  7 +++++++
> >  arch/riscv/Makefile                     | 10 ++++++++++
> >  arch/riscv/include/asm/stackprotector.h |  3 ++-
> >  arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c         |  3 +++
> >  arch/riscv/kernel/process.c             |  2 +-
> >  5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
> > index 4b0e308..d98ce29 100644
> > --- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig
> > +++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
> > @@ -394,6 +394,13 @@ config CMDLINE_FORCE
> >
> >  endchoice
> >
> > +config CC_HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR_TLS
> > +     def_bool $(cc-option,-mstack-protector-guard=tls -mstack-protector-guard-reg=tp -mstack-protector-guard-offset=0)
> > +
> > +config STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK
> > +     def_bool y
> > +     depends on STACKPROTECTOR && CC_HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR_TLS
> > +
> >  endmenu
> >
> >  config BUILTIN_DTB
> > diff --git a/arch/riscv/Makefile b/arch/riscv/Makefile
> > index fb6e37d..f5f8ee9 100644
> > --- a/arch/riscv/Makefile
> > +++ b/arch/riscv/Makefile
> > @@ -68,6 +68,16 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE += $(call cc-option,-mno-relax)
> >  # architectures.  It's faster to have GCC emit only aligned accesses.
> >  KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mstrict-align)
> >
> > +ifeq ($(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK),y)
> > +prepare: stack_protector_prepare
> > +stack_protector_prepare: prepare0
> > +     $(eval KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mstack-protector-guard=tls               \
> > +                             -mstack-protector-guard-reg=tp            \
> > +                             -mstack-protector-guard-offset=$(shell    \
> > +                     awk '{if ($$2 == "TSK_STACK_CANARY") print $$3;}' \
> > +                                     include/generated/asm-offsets.h))
> > +endif
> > +
> >  # arch specific predefines for sparse
> >  CHECKFLAGS += -D__riscv -D__riscv_xlen=$(BITS)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/stackprotector.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/stackprotector.h
> > index d95f7b2..a895e07 100644
> > --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/stackprotector.h
> > +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/stackprotector.h
> > @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
> >       canary &= CANARY_MASK;
> >
> >       current->stack_canary = canary;
> > -     __stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary;
> > +     if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK))
> > +             __stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary;
> >  }
> >  #endif /* _ASM_RISCV_STACKPROTECTOR_H */
> > diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> > index 07cb9c1..999b465 100644
> > --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> > +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> > @@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ void asm_offsets(void)
> >       OFFSET(TASK_THREAD_S11, task_struct, thread.s[11]);
> >       OFFSET(TASK_THREAD_SP, task_struct, thread.sp);
> >       OFFSET(TASK_STACK, task_struct, stack);
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
>
> Should this be CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK ?
Yes, it's more accurate, Thx. I also send a patch [1] to arm64, and
let's see how they reply?

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-csky/1594613013-13059-1-git-send-email-guoren@kernel.org/T/#u

-- 
Best Regards
 Guo Ren

ML: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-csky/

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