linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support

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Message-ID: <20200715093426.GK16200@suse.de>
Date:   Wed, 15 Jul 2020 11:34:26 +0200
From:   Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
To:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc:     Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, x86@...nel.org, hpa@...or.com,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Cfir Cohen <cfir@...gle.com>,
        Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@...gle.com>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Mike Stunes <mstunes@...are.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@...il.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support

On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 11:24:56AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> Can we get some more words -- preferably in actual code comments, on
> when exactly #VC happens?

Sure, will add this as a comment before the actual runtime VC handler.

> Because the only thing I remember is that #VC could happen on any memop,
> but I also have vague memories of that being a later extention.

Currently it is only raised when something happens that the hypervisor
intercepts, for example on a couple of instructions like CPUID,
RD/WRMSR, ..., or on MMIO/IOIO accesses.

With Secure Nested Paging (SNP), which needs additional enablement, a #VC can
happen on any memory access. I wrote the IST handling entry code for #VC
with that in mind, but do not actually enable it. This is the reason why
the #VC handler just panics the system when it ends up on the fall-back
(VC2) stack, with SNP enabled it needs to handle the SNP exit-codes in
that path.

Regards,

	Joerg