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Message-ID: <159493172491.3249370.12796192457457028352.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2020 21:35:24 +0100
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc: dhowells@...hat.com,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, jlayton@...hat.com,
christian@...uner.io, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
linux-afs@...ts.infradead.org, linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org,
linux-cifs@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH 4/5] keys: Split the search perms between KEY_NEED_USE and
KEY_NEED_SEARCH
Allow the permission needed for a keyring search to be specified and split
the permissions between KEY_NEED_USE (the kernel wants to do something with
the key) and KEY_NEED_SEARCH (userspace wants to do something with the
key).
This primarily affects how request_key() works, differentiating implicit
calls (e.g. from filesystems) from userspace calling the request_key()
system call.
This will allow the kernel to find keys in a hidden container keyring, but
not the denizens of the container.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
---
certs/blacklist.c | 2 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 2 +-
include/linux/key.h | 2 ++
net/rxrpc/security.c | 2 +-
security/keys/internal.h | 4 ++++
security/keys/keyctl.c | 6 ++++--
security/keys/keyring.c | 13 ++++++++-----
security/keys/permission.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/keys/proc.c | 1 +
security/keys/process_keys.c | 8 ++++++--
security/keys/request_key.c | 5 +++++
security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 1 +
12 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c
index aff83e3a9f49..29c3cb6254d9 100644
--- a/certs/blacklist.c
+++ b/certs/blacklist.c
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len, const char *type)
*p = 0;
kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true),
- &key_type_blacklist, buffer, false);
+ &key_type_blacklist, buffer, KEY_NEED_USE, false);
if (!IS_ERR(kref)) {
key_ref_put(kref);
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index 6e5fc8e31f01..4559ac2f0bb7 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ struct key *find_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", req);
ref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
- &key_type_asymmetric, req, true);
+ &key_type_asymmetric, req, KEY_NEED_USE, true);
if (IS_ERR(ref))
pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", req, PTR_ERR(ref));
kfree(req);
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 94a6d51464b5..0db5539366e7 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
#define KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN 0x0004 /* Key is built into kernel */
#define KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION 0x0008 /* Override the check on restricted keyrings */
#define KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING 0x0010 /* allocating a user or user session keyring */
+#define KEY_ALLOC_USERSPACE_REQUEST 0x0020 /* Userspace requested the key */
extern void key_revoke(struct key *key);
extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key);
@@ -432,6 +433,7 @@ extern int keyring_clear(struct key *keyring);
extern key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
+ enum key_need_perm need_perm,
bool recurse);
extern int keyring_add_key(struct key *keyring,
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/security.c b/net/rxrpc/security.c
index 9b1fb9ed0717..23077cfe3d44 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/security.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/security.c
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ bool rxrpc_look_up_server_security(struct rxrpc_local *local, struct rxrpc_sock
/* look through the service's keyring */
kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(rx->securities, 1UL),
- &key_type_rxrpc_s, kdesc, true);
+ &key_type_rxrpc_s, kdesc, KEY_NEED_USE, true);
if (IS_ERR(kref)) {
trace_rxrpc_abort(0, "SVK",
sp->hdr.cid, sp->hdr.callNumber, sp->hdr.seq,
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index af2c9531c435..d0d1bce95674 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ struct keyring_search_context {
struct keyring_index_key index_key;
const struct cred *cred;
struct key_match_data match_data;
+ enum key_need_perm need_perm; /* Permission required for search */
unsigned flags;
#define KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK 0x0001 /* Skip state checks */
#define KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK 0x0002 /* Override NO_STATE_CHECK */
@@ -196,6 +197,9 @@ extern void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype);
extern int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred,
enum key_need_perm need_perm);
+extern int key_search_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
+ struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
+ enum key_need_perm need_perm);
extern unsigned int key_acl_to_perm(const struct key_acl *acl);
extern long key_set_acl(struct key *key, struct key_acl *acl);
extern void key_put_acl(struct key_acl *acl);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index fae2df676e30..54a2bfff9af2 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -225,7 +225,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
key = request_key_and_link(ktype, description, NULL, callout_info,
callout_len, NULL, NULL,
key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref),
- KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
+ KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA |
+ KEY_ALLOC_USERSPACE_REQUEST);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key);
goto error5;
@@ -685,7 +686,8 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
}
/* do the search */
- key_ref = keyring_search(keyring_ref, ktype, description, true);
+ key_ref = keyring_search(keyring_ref, ktype, description,
+ KEY_NEED_SEARCH, true);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index f14aabf27a51..1779c95b428c 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -621,8 +621,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
/* key must have search permissions */
if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) &&
- key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
- ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0) {
+ key_search_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
+ ctx, ctx->need_perm) < 0) {
ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
kleave(" = %d [!perm]", ctx->skipped_ret);
goto skipped;
@@ -798,8 +798,8 @@ static bool search_nested_keyrings(struct key *keyring,
/* Search a nested keyring */
if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) &&
- key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
- ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
+ key_search_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
+ ctx, KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
continue;
/* stack the current position */
@@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_rcu(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM)) {
- err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
+ err = key_search_permission(keyring_ref, ctx, ctx->need_perm);
if (err < 0)
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
@@ -937,6 +937,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_rcu(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
* @keyring: The root of the keyring tree to be searched.
* @type: The type of keyring we want to find.
* @description: The name of the keyring we want to find.
+ * @need_perm: The permission required of the target key.
* @recurse: True to search the children of @keyring also
*
* As keyring_search_rcu() above, but using the current task's credentials and
@@ -945,6 +946,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_rcu(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
+ enum key_need_perm need_perm,
bool recurse)
{
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
@@ -955,6 +957,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
.match_data.cmp = key_default_cmp,
.match_data.raw_data = description,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+ .need_perm = need_perm,
.flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK,
};
key_ref_t key;
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
index 0bb7f6b695f4..3ae4d9aedc3a 100644
--- a/security/keys/permission.c
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -253,6 +253,37 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
return security_key_permission(key_ref, cred, need_perm, notes);
}
+/**
+ * key_search_permission - Check a key can be searched for
+ * @key_ref: The key to check.
+ * @cred: The credentials to use.
+ * @need_perm: The permission required.
+ *
+ * Check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way,
+ * but permit the security modules to override.
+ *
+ * The caller must hold the RCU readlock.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful, -EACCES if access is denied based on the
+ * permissions bits or the LSM check.
+ */
+int key_search_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
+ struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
+ enum key_need_perm need_perm)
+{
+ unsigned int allow, notes = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ allow = key_resolve_acl(key_ref, ctx->cred);
+
+ ret = check_key_permission(key_ref, ctx->cred, allow, need_perm, ¬es);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Let the LSMs be the final arbiter */
+ return security_key_permission(key_ref, ctx->cred, need_perm, notes);
+}
+
/**
* key_validate - Validate a key.
* @key: The key to be validated.
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index c68ec5f98659..a6b349ee1759 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
.match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed,
.match_data.raw_data = key,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+ .need_perm = KEY_NEED_SEARCH,
.flags = (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
KEYRING_SEARCH_RECURSE),
};
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 11227101bea0..3721f96dd6fb 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ int look_up_user_keyrings(struct key **_user_keyring,
*/
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "_uid.%u", uid);
uid_keyring_r = keyring_search(make_key_ref(reg_keyring, true),
- &key_type_keyring, buf, false);
+ &key_type_keyring, buf, KEY_NEED_SEARCH,
+ false);
kdebug("_uid %p", uid_keyring_r);
if (uid_keyring_r == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN)) {
uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, cred->user->uid, INVALID_GID,
@@ -157,7 +158,8 @@ int look_up_user_keyrings(struct key **_user_keyring,
/* Get a default session keyring (which might also exist already) */
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "_uid_ses.%u", uid);
session_keyring_r = keyring_search(make_key_ref(reg_keyring, true),
- &key_type_keyring, buf, false);
+ &key_type_keyring, buf, KEY_NEED_SEARCH,
+ false);
kdebug("_uid_ses %p", session_keyring_r);
if (session_keyring_r == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN)) {
session_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, cred->user->uid, INVALID_GID,
@@ -230,6 +232,7 @@ struct key *get_user_session_keyring_rcu(const struct cred *cred)
.match_data.cmp = key_default_cmp,
.match_data.raw_data = buf,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+ .need_perm = KEY_NEED_SEARCH,
.flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK,
};
@@ -648,6 +651,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+ .need_perm = KEY_NEED_SEARCH,
.flags = (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
KEYRING_SEARCH_RECURSE),
};
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 2b84efb420cb..479ae0573d1e 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -567,6 +567,7 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
.match_data.cmp = key_default_cmp,
.match_data.raw_data = description,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+ .need_perm = KEY_NEED_USE,
.flags = (KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK |
KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED |
KEYRING_SEARCH_RECURSE),
@@ -579,6 +580,9 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
ctx.index_key.type->name, ctx.index_key.description,
callout_info, callout_len, aux, dest_keyring, flags);
+ if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_USERSPACE_REQUEST)
+ ctx.need_perm = KEY_NEED_SEARCH;
+
if (type->match_preparse) {
ret = type->match_preparse(&ctx.match_data);
if (ret < 0) {
@@ -774,6 +778,7 @@ struct key *request_key_rcu(struct key_type *type,
.match_data.cmp = key_default_cmp,
.match_data.raw_data = description,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+ .need_perm = KEY_NEED_USE,
.flags = (KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK |
KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED),
};
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index ee8c5fe6ed61..f8f77af152de 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
.match_data.cmp = key_default_cmp,
.match_data.raw_data = description,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
+ .need_perm = KEY_NEED_USE,
.flags = (KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK |
KEYRING_SEARCH_RECURSE),
};
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