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Message-Id: <20200716152900.1709694-1-colin.king@canonical.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2020 16:29:00 +0100
From: Colin King <colin.king@...onical.com>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] crypto: xts: use memmove to avoid overlapped memory copy
From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>
There is a memcpy that performs a potential overlapped memory copy
from source b to destination b + 1. Fix this by using the safer
memmove instead.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Overlapping buffer in memory copy")
Fixes: 8083b1bf8163 ("crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>
---
crypto/xts.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/xts.c b/crypto/xts.c
index 3565f3b863a6..fa3e6e7b7043 100644
--- a/crypto/xts.c
+++ b/crypto/xts.c
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static int cts_final(struct skcipher_request *req,
offset - XTS_BLOCK_SIZE);
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, rctx->tail, 0, XTS_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
- memcpy(b + 1, b, tail);
+ memmove(b + 1, b, tail);
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, req->src, offset, tail, 0);
le128_xor(b, &rctx->t, b);
--
2.27.0
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