linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 2/2] Add a new sysctl knob: unprivileged_userfaultfd_user_mode

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CABXk95A-E4NYqA5qVrPgDF18YW-z4_udzLwa0cdo2OfqVsy=SQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 17 Jul 2020 14:57:13 +0200
From:   Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@...gle.com>
To:     Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
Cc:     Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@...gle.com>,
        Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
        Daniel Colascione <dancol@...gle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
        Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@...gle.com>,
        Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@...nel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@...il.com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Mel Gorman <mgorman@...hsingularity.net>,
        Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>,
        Peter Xu <peterx@...hat.com>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Jerome Glisse <jglisse@...hat.com>, Shaohua Li <shli@...com>,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, Tim Murray <timmurray@...gle.com>,
        Minchan Kim <minchan@...gle.com>,
        Sandeep Patil <sspatil@...gle.com>, kernel@...roid.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] Add a new sysctl knob: unprivileged_userfaultfd_user_mode_only

On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 11:17 PM Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 01:17:20PM -0700, Lokesh Gidra wrote:
> > Adding the Android kernel team in the discussion.
>
> Unless I'm mistaken that you can already enforce bit 1 of the second
> parameter of the userfaultfd syscall to be set with seccomp-bpf, this
> would be more a question to the Android userland team.
>
> The question would be: does it ever happen that a seccomp filter isn't
> already applied to unprivileged software running without
> SYS_CAP_PTRACE capability?

Yes.

Android uses selinux as our primary sandboxing mechanism. We do use
seccomp on a few processes, but we have found that it has a
surprisingly high performance cost [1] on arm64 devices so turning it
on system wide is not a good option.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/202006011116.3F7109A@keescook/T/#m82ace19539ac595682affabdf652c0ffa5d27dad
>
>
> If answer is "no" the behavior of the new sysctl in patch 2/2 (in
> subject) should be enforceable with minor changes to the BPF
> assembly. Otherwise it'd require more changes.
>
> Thanks!
> Andrea
>