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Message-Id: <20200719100418.2112740-5-areber@redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2020 12:04:14 +0200
From: Adrian Reber <areber@...hat.com>
To: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <ovzxemul@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@...il.com>,
Andrei Vagin <avagin@...il.com>,
Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@...sigma.com>,
Michał Cłapiński
<mclapinski@...gle.com>, Kamil Yurtsever <kyurtsever@...gle.com>,
Dirk Petersen <dipeit@...il.com>,
Christine Flood <chf@...hat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
Radostin Stoyanov <rstoyanov1@...il.com>,
Adrian Reber <areber@...hat.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v6 4/7] proc: allow access in init userns for map_files with CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
Opening files in /proc/pid/map_files when the current user is
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable in the root namespace is useful for
checkpointing and restoring to recover files that are unreachable via
the file system such as deleted files, or memfd files.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@...sigma.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 65893686d1f1..b824a8c89011 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2194,16 +2194,16 @@ struct map_files_info {
};
/*
- * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN to follow the links, due to concerns about how the
- * symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on ancestor directories in the
- * path to the file in question.
+ * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to follow the links, due
+ * to concerns about how the symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on
+ * ancestor directories in the path to the file in question.
*/
static const char *
proc_map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode,
struct delayed_call *done)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(&init_user_ns))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
return proc_pid_get_link(dentry, inode, done);
--
2.26.2
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