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Message-ID: <159516469375.4147.270001582364335381.tglx@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2020 13:18:13 -0000
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org
Subject: [GIT pull] x86/urgent for v5.8-rc6
Linus,
please pull the latest x86/urgent branch from:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-urgent-2020-07-19
up to: da05b143a308: x86/boot: Don't add the EFI stub to targets
A pile of fixes for x86:
- Fix the I/O bitmap invalidation on XEN PV, which was overlooked in the
recent ioperm/iopl rework. This caused the TSS and XEN's I/O bitmap to
get out of sync.
- Use the proper vectors for HYPERV.
- Make disabling of stack protector for the entry code work with GCC
builds which enable stack protector by default. Removing the option is
not sufficient, it needs an explicit -fno-stack-protector to shut it
off.
- Mark check_user_regs() noinstr as it is called from noinstr code. The
missing annotation causes it to be placed in the text section which
makes it instrumentable.
- Add the missing interrupt disable in exc_alignment_check()
- Fixup a XEN_PV build dependency in the 32bit entry code
- A few fixes to make the Clang integrated assembler happy
- Move EFI stub build to the right place for out of tree builds
- Make prepare_exit_to_usermode() static. It's not longer called from ASM
code.
Thanks,
tglx
------------------>
Andy Lutomirski (1):
x86/ioperm: Fix io bitmap invalidation on Xen PV
Arnd Bergmann (1):
x86: math-emu: Fix up 'cmp' insn for clang ias
Arvind Sankar (1):
x86/boot: Don't add the EFI stub to targets
Ingo Molnar (1):
x86/entry/32: Fix XEN_PV build dependency
Jian Cai (1):
x86/entry: Add compatibility with IAS
Kees Cook (1):
x86/entry: Actually disable stack protector
Sedat Dilek (1):
x86/entry: Fix vectors to IDTENTRY_SYSVEC for CONFIG_HYPERV
Thomas Gleixner (3):
x86/traps: Disable interrupts in exc_aligment_check()
x86/entry: Mark check_user_regs() noinstr
x86/entry/common: Make prepare_exit_to_usermode() static
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 4 ++--
arch/x86/entry/Makefile | 14 +++++++++++---
arch/x86/entry/common.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 22 ++++++++++------------
arch/x86/include/asm/io_bitmap.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h | 5 +++++
arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 18 ++----------------
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 2 ++
arch/x86/math-emu/wm_sqrt.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 12 ++++++++++++
12 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
index 7619742f91c9..5a828fde7a42 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ endif
vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += $(obj)/acpi.o
-vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) += $(objtree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/lib.a
vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED) += $(obj)/efi_thunk_$(BITS).o
+efi-obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) = $(objtree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/lib.a
# The compressed kernel is built with -fPIC/-fPIE so that a boot loader
# can place it anywhere in memory and it will still run. However, since
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ endef
quiet_cmd_check-and-link-vmlinux = LD $@
cmd_check-and-link-vmlinux = $(cmd_check_data_rel); $(cmd_ld)
-$(obj)/vmlinux: $(vmlinux-objs-y) FORCE
+$(obj)/vmlinux: $(vmlinux-objs-y) $(efi-obj-y) FORCE
$(call if_changed,check-and-link-vmlinux)
OBJCOPYFLAGS_vmlinux.bin := -R .comment -S
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/Makefile
index b7a5790d8d63..08bf95dbc911 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/Makefile
@@ -7,12 +7,20 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE := n
UBSAN_SANITIZE := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_common.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_32.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_64.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_common.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_64.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_32.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_x32.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+
+CFLAGS_common.o += -fno-stack-protector
+CFLAGS_syscall_64.o += -fno-stack-protector
+CFLAGS_syscall_32.o += -fno-stack-protector
+CFLAGS_syscall_x32.o += -fno-stack-protector
CFLAGS_syscall_64.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
CFLAGS_syscall_32.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
+CFLAGS_syscall_x32.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
+
obj-y := entry_$(BITS).o thunk_$(BITS).o syscall_$(BITS).o
obj-y += common.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
index e83b3f14897c..f09288431f28 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
#include <trace/events/syscalls.h>
/* Check that the stack and regs on entry from user mode are sane. */
-static void check_user_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)
+static noinstr void check_user_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY)) {
/*
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static void __prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs)
#endif
}
-__visible noinstr void prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs)
+static noinstr void prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
instrumentation_begin();
__prepare_exit_to_usermode(regs);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
index eeac6dc2adaa..80d3b30d3ee3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
@@ -469,16 +469,15 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs, \
.align 8
SYM_CODE_START(irq_entries_start)
vector=FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR
- pos = .
.rept (FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR - FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR)
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
+0 :
.byte 0x6a, vector
jmp asm_common_interrupt
nop
/* Ensure that the above is 8 bytes max */
- . = pos + 8
- pos=pos+8
- vector=vector+1
+ . = 0b + 8
+ vector = vector+1
.endr
SYM_CODE_END(irq_entries_start)
@@ -486,16 +485,15 @@ SYM_CODE_END(irq_entries_start)
.align 8
SYM_CODE_START(spurious_entries_start)
vector=FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR
- pos = .
.rept (NR_VECTORS - FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR)
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
+0 :
.byte 0x6a, vector
jmp asm_spurious_interrupt
nop
/* Ensure that the above is 8 bytes max */
- . = pos + 8
- pos=pos+8
- vector=vector+1
+ . = 0b + 8
+ vector = vector+1
.endr
SYM_CODE_END(spurious_entries_start)
#endif
@@ -553,7 +551,7 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_MC, exc_machine_check);
/* NMI */
DECLARE_IDTENTRY_NMI(X86_TRAP_NMI, exc_nmi);
-#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
+#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_PV) && defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_NMI, xenpv_exc_nmi);
#endif
@@ -563,7 +561,7 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_DEBUG(X86_TRAP_DB, exc_debug);
#else
DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_DB, exc_debug);
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
+#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_PV) && defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_DB, xenpv_exc_debug);
#endif
@@ -626,8 +624,8 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(POSTED_INTR_NESTED_VECTOR, sysvec_kvm_posted_intr_nested
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
DECLARE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR, sysvec_hyperv_callback);
-DECLARE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(HYPERVISOR_REENLIGHTENMENT_VECTOR, sysvec_hyperv_reenlightenment);
-DECLARE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(HYPERVISOR_STIMER0_VECTOR, sysvec_hyperv_stimer0);
+DECLARE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(HYPERV_REENLIGHTENMENT_VECTOR, sysvec_hyperv_reenlightenment);
+DECLARE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR, sysvec_hyperv_stimer0);
#endif
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ACRN_GUEST)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io_bitmap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/io_bitmap.h
index ac1a99ffbd8d..7f080f5c7def 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io_bitmap.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io_bitmap.h
@@ -19,12 +19,28 @@ struct task_struct;
void io_bitmap_share(struct task_struct *tsk);
void io_bitmap_exit(struct task_struct *tsk);
+static inline void native_tss_invalidate_io_bitmap(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Invalidate the I/O bitmap by moving io_bitmap_base outside the
+ * TSS limit so any subsequent I/O access from user space will
+ * trigger a #GP.
+ *
+ * This is correct even when VMEXIT rewrites the TSS limit
+ * to 0x67 as the only requirement is that the base points
+ * outside the limit.
+ */
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.io_bitmap_base,
+ IO_BITMAP_OFFSET_INVALID);
+}
+
void native_tss_update_io_bitmap(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
#else
#define tss_update_io_bitmap native_tss_update_io_bitmap
+#define tss_invalidate_io_bitmap native_tss_invalidate_io_bitmap
#endif
#else
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h
index 5ca5d297df75..3d2afecde50c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h
@@ -302,6 +302,11 @@ static inline void write_idt_entry(gate_desc *dt, int entry, const gate_desc *g)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM
+static inline void tss_invalidate_io_bitmap(void)
+{
+ PVOP_VCALL0(cpu.invalidate_io_bitmap);
+}
+
static inline void tss_update_io_bitmap(void)
{
PVOP_VCALL0(cpu.update_io_bitmap);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h
index 732f62e04ddb..8dfcb2508e6d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt_types.h
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ struct pv_cpu_ops {
void (*load_sp0)(unsigned long sp0);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM
+ void (*invalidate_io_bitmap)(void);
void (*update_io_bitmap)(void);
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c
index 674a7d66d960..de2138ba38e5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c
@@ -324,7 +324,8 @@ struct paravirt_patch_template pv_ops = {
.cpu.swapgs = native_swapgs,
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM
- .cpu.update_io_bitmap = native_tss_update_io_bitmap,
+ .cpu.invalidate_io_bitmap = native_tss_invalidate_io_bitmap,
+ .cpu.update_io_bitmap = native_tss_update_io_bitmap,
#endif
.cpu.start_context_switch = paravirt_nop,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index f362ce0d5ac0..fe67dbd76e51 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -322,20 +322,6 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM
-static inline void tss_invalidate_io_bitmap(struct tss_struct *tss)
-{
- /*
- * Invalidate the I/O bitmap by moving io_bitmap_base outside the
- * TSS limit so any subsequent I/O access from user space will
- * trigger a #GP.
- *
- * This is correct even when VMEXIT rewrites the TSS limit
- * to 0x67 as the only requirement is that the base points
- * outside the limit.
- */
- tss->x86_tss.io_bitmap_base = IO_BITMAP_OFFSET_INVALID;
-}
-
static inline void switch_to_bitmap(unsigned long tifp)
{
/*
@@ -346,7 +332,7 @@ static inline void switch_to_bitmap(unsigned long tifp)
* user mode.
*/
if (tifp & _TIF_IO_BITMAP)
- tss_invalidate_io_bitmap(this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tss_rw));
+ tss_invalidate_io_bitmap();
}
static void tss_copy_io_bitmap(struct tss_struct *tss, struct io_bitmap *iobm)
@@ -380,7 +366,7 @@ void native_tss_update_io_bitmap(void)
u16 *base = &tss->x86_tss.io_bitmap_base;
if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_IO_BITMAP)) {
- tss_invalidate_io_bitmap(tss);
+ native_tss_invalidate_io_bitmap();
return;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 6ed8cc5fbe8f..4f3a509e5547 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_alignment_check)
do_trap(X86_TRAP_AC, SIGBUS, "alignment check", regs,
error_code, BUS_ADRALN, NULL);
+
+ local_irq_disable();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
diff --git a/arch/x86/math-emu/wm_sqrt.S b/arch/x86/math-emu/wm_sqrt.S
index 3b2b58164ec1..40526dd85137 100644
--- a/arch/x86/math-emu/wm_sqrt.S
+++ b/arch/x86/math-emu/wm_sqrt.S
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ sqrt_stage_2_finish:
#ifdef PARANOID
/* It should be possible to get here only if the arg is ffff....ffff */
- cmp $0xffffffff,FPU_fsqrt_arg_1
+ cmpl $0xffffffff,FPU_fsqrt_arg_1
jnz sqrt_stage_2_error
#endif /* PARANOID */
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
index 0d68948c82ad..c46b9f2e732f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
@@ -870,6 +870,17 @@ static void xen_load_sp0(unsigned long sp0)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM
+static void xen_invalidate_io_bitmap(void)
+{
+ struct physdev_set_iobitmap iobitmap = {
+ .bitmap = 0,
+ .nr_ports = 0,
+ };
+
+ native_tss_invalidate_io_bitmap();
+ HYPERVISOR_physdev_op(PHYSDEVOP_set_iobitmap, &iobitmap);
+}
+
static void xen_update_io_bitmap(void)
{
struct physdev_set_iobitmap iobitmap;
@@ -1099,6 +1110,7 @@ static const struct pv_cpu_ops xen_cpu_ops __initconst = {
.load_sp0 = xen_load_sp0,
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM
+ .invalidate_io_bitmap = xen_invalidate_io_bitmap,
.update_io_bitmap = xen_update_io_bitmap,
#endif
.io_delay = xen_io_delay,
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