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Message-ID: <b55a09f7-c0ce-f2ff-a725-87a8e042ab80@redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2020 18:06:00 +0200
From: Auger Eric <eric.auger@...hat.com>
To: Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@...el.com>, alex.williamson@...hat.com,
baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com, joro@...tes.org
Cc: kevin.tian@...el.com, jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com,
ashok.raj@...el.com, jun.j.tian@...el.com, yi.y.sun@...el.com,
jean-philippe@...aro.org, peterx@...hat.com, hao.wu@...el.com,
stefanha@...il.com, iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 09/15] iommu/vt-d: Check ownership for PASIDs from
user-space
Hi Yi,
On 7/12/20 1:21 PM, Liu Yi L wrote:
> When an IOMMU domain with nesting attribute is used for guest SVA, a
> system-wide PASID is allocated for binding with the device and the domain.
> For security reason, we need to check the PASID passsed from user-space.
passed
> e.g. page table bind/unbind and PASID related cache invalidation.
>
> Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@...el.com>
> CC: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>
> Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>
> Cc: Eric Auger <eric.auger@...hat.com>
> Cc: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@...aro.org>
> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
> Cc: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>
> ---
> drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 10 ++++++++++
> drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c | 7 +++++--
> 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
> index 4d54198..a9504cb 100644
> --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
> +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
> @@ -5436,6 +5436,7 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev,
> int granu = 0;
> u64 pasid = 0;
> u64 addr = 0;
> + void *pdata;
>
> granu = to_vtd_granularity(cache_type, inv_info->granularity);
> if (granu == -EINVAL) {
> @@ -5456,6 +5457,15 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev,
> (inv_info->granu.addr_info.flags & IOMMU_INV_ADDR_FLAGS_PASID))
> pasid = inv_info->granu.addr_info.pasid;
>
> + pdata = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL);
> + if (!pdata) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out_unlock;
> + } else if (IS_ERR(pdata)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(pdata);
> + goto out_unlock;
> + }
> +
> switch (BIT(cache_type)) {
> case IOMMU_CACHE_INV_TYPE_IOTLB:
> /* HW will ignore LSB bits based on address mask */
> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c
> index d2c0e1a..212dee0 100644
> --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c
> +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c
> @@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ int intel_svm_bind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev,
> dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain);
>
> mutex_lock(&pasid_mutex);
> - svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, data->hpasid, NULL);
I do not get what the call was supposed to do before that patch?
> + svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, data->hpasid, NULL);
> if (IS_ERR(svm)) {
> ret = PTR_ERR(svm);
> goto out;
> @@ -436,6 +436,7 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain,
> struct device *dev, ioasid_t pasid)
> {
> struct intel_iommu *iommu = intel_svm_device_to_iommu(dev);
> + struct dmar_domain *dmar_domain;
> struct intel_svm_dev *sdev;
> struct intel_svm *svm;
> int ret = -EINVAL;
> @@ -443,8 +444,10 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain,
> if (WARN_ON(!iommu))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain);
> +
> mutex_lock(&pasid_mutex);
> - svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, pasid, NULL);
> + svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL);
just to make sure, about the locking, can't domain->ioasid_sid change
under the hood?
Thanks
Eric
> if (!svm) {
> ret = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
>
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