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Message-ID: <CA+EESO40x0+FW2ek5E=EYoHXt_AX2hvJ6QjbS=GSh9CpJQQRAA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 07:41:12 -0700
From: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@...gle.com>
To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>, kernel@...roid.com
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@...gle.com>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@...nel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@...il.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
Mel Gorman <mgorman@...hsingularity.net>,
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>,
Peter Xu <peterx@...hat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
Jerome Glisse <jglisse@...hat.com>, Shaohua Li <shli@...com>,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
Tim Murray <timmurray@...gle.com>,
Minchan Kim <minchan@...gle.com>,
Sandeep Patil <sspatil@...gle.com>,
Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>,
Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@...gle.com>,
Daniel Colascione <dancol@...col.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] Control over userfaultfd kernel-fault handling
On Fri, Jul 24, 2020 at 7:01 AM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 05:26:30PM -0700, Daniel Colascione wrote:
> > This small patch series adds a new flag to userfaultfd(2) that allows
> > callers to give up the ability to handle user-mode faults with the
> > resulting UFFD file object. In then add a new sysctl to require
> > unprivileged callers to use this new flag.
> >
> > The purpose of this new interface is to decrease the change of an
> > unprivileged userfaultfd user taking advantage of userfaultfd to
> > enhance security vulnerabilities by lengthening the race window in
> > kernel code.
>
> There are other ways to lengthen the race window, such as madvise
> MADV_DONTNEED, mmap of fuse files ...
> Could the patchset commit log include some discussion about
> why these are not the concern please?
>
> Multiple subsystems including vhost have come to rely on
> copy from/to user behaving identically to userspace access.
>
> Could the patchset please include discussion on what effect blocking
> these will have? E.g. I guess Android doesn't use vhost right now.
> Will it want to do it to run VMs in 2021?
>
> Thanks!
>
> > This patch series is split from [1].
> >
> > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200211225547.235083-1-dancol@google.com/
>
> So in that series, Kees said:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202002112332.BE71455@keescook/#t
>
> What is the threat being solved? (I understand the threat, but detailing
> it in the commit log is important for people who don't know it.)
>
Adding Android security folks, Nick and Jeff, to answer.
> Could you pls do that?
>
> > Daniel Colascione (2):
> > Add UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY
> > Add a new sysctl knob: unprivileged_userfaultfd_user_mode_only
> >
> > Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst | 13 +++++++++++++
> > fs/userfaultfd.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
> > include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h | 1 +
> > include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h | 9 +++++++++
> > kernel/sysctl.c | 9 +++++++++
> > 5 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > --
> > 2.26.2.303.gf8c07b1a785-goog
> >
>
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