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Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 10:11:00 +1000
From: Balbir Singh <sblbir@...zon.com>
To: <tglx@...utronix.de>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
CC: <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, <tony.luck@...el.com>,
<keescook@...omium.org>, <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
<x86@...nel.org>, <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
<thomas.lendacky@....com>, <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
<mingo@...nel.org>, Balbir Singh <sblbir@...zon.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/mm: Refactor cond_ibpb() to support other use cases
cond_ibpb() has the necessary bits required to track the previous mm in
switch_mm_irqs_off(). This can be reused for other use cases like L1D
flushing on context switch.
[ tglx: Moved comment, added a separate define for state (re)initialization ]
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <sblbir@...zon.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200510014803.12190-4-sblbir@amazon.com
---
arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++---------------
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
index 8c87a2e0b660..a927d40664df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ struct tlb_state {
/* Last user mm for optimizing IBPB */
union {
struct mm_struct *last_user_mm;
- unsigned long last_user_mm_ibpb;
+ unsigned long last_user_mm_spec;
};
u16 loaded_mm_asid;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index 1a3569b43aa5..e031b324c704 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -43,10 +43,14 @@
*/
/*
- * Use bit 0 to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB state into the mm pointer which is
- * stored in cpu_tlb_state.last_user_mm_ibpb.
+ * Bits to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB state into the mm pointer which is
+ * stored in cpu_tlb_state.last_user_mm_spec.
*/
#define LAST_USER_MM_IBPB 0x1UL
+#define LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK (LAST_USER_MM_IBPB)
+
+/* Bits to set when tlbstate and flush is (re)initialized */
+#define LAST_USER_MM_INIT LAST_USER_MM_IBPB
/*
* The x86 feature is called PCID (Process Context IDentifier). It is similar
@@ -317,20 +321,29 @@ void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
-static inline unsigned long mm_mangle_tif_spec_ib(struct task_struct *next)
+static inline unsigned long mm_mangle_tif_spec_bits(struct task_struct *next)
{
unsigned long next_tif = task_thread_info(next)->flags;
- unsigned long ibpb = (next_tif >> TIF_SPEC_IB) & LAST_USER_MM_IBPB;
+ unsigned long spec_bits = (next_tif >> TIF_SPEC_IB) & LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK;
- return (unsigned long)next->mm | ibpb;
+ return (unsigned long)next->mm | spec_bits;
}
-static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct *next)
+static void cond_mitigation(struct task_struct *next)
{
+ unsigned long prev_mm, next_mm;
+
if (!next || !next->mm)
return;
+ next_mm = mm_mangle_tif_spec_bits(next);
+ prev_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec);
+
/*
+ * Avoid user/user BTB poisoning by flushing the branch predictor
+ * when switching between processes. This stops one process from
+ * doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another.
+ *
* Both, the conditional and the always IBPB mode use the mm
* pointer to avoid the IBPB when switching between tasks of the
* same process. Using the mm pointer instead of mm->context.ctx_id
@@ -340,8 +353,6 @@ static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct *next)
* exposed data is not really interesting.
*/
if (static_branch_likely(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb)) {
- unsigned long prev_mm, next_mm;
-
/*
* This is a bit more complex than the always mode because
* it has to handle two cases:
@@ -371,20 +382,14 @@ static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct *next)
* Optimize this with reasonably small overhead for the
* above cases. Mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB bit into the mm
* pointer of the incoming task which is stored in
- * cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb for comparison.
- */
- next_mm = mm_mangle_tif_spec_ib(next);
- prev_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb);
-
- /*
+ * cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec for comparison.
+ *
* Issue IBPB only if the mm's are different and one or
* both have the IBPB bit set.
*/
if (next_mm != prev_mm &&
(next_mm | prev_mm) & LAST_USER_MM_IBPB)
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
-
- this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb, next_mm);
}
if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_mm_always_ibpb)) {
@@ -393,11 +398,12 @@ static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct *next)
* different context than the user space task which ran
* last on this CPU.
*/
- if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm) != next->mm) {
+ if ((prev_mm & ~LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK) !=
+ (unsigned long)next->mm)
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
- this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm, next->mm);
- }
}
+
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec, next_mm);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
@@ -519,11 +525,10 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
need_flush = true;
} else {
/*
- * Avoid user/user BTB poisoning by flushing the branch
- * predictor when switching between processes. This stops
- * one process from doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another.
+ * Apply process to process speculation vulnerability
+ * mitigations if applicable.
*/
- cond_ibpb(tsk);
+ cond_mitigation(tsk);
/*
* Stop remote flushes for the previous mm.
@@ -640,7 +645,7 @@ void initialize_tlbstate_and_flush(void)
write_cr3(build_cr3(mm->pgd, 0));
/* Reinitialize tlbstate. */
- this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb, LAST_USER_MM_IBPB);
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec, LAST_USER_MM_INIT);
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid, 0);
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.next_asid, 1);
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[0].ctx_id, mm->context.ctx_id);
--
2.17.1
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