[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20200729012039.GN4332@42.do-not-panic.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 01:20:39 +0000
From: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, rafael@...nel.org,
ebiederm@...ssion.com, jeyu@...nel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
paul@...l-moore.com, stephen.smalley.work@...il.com,
eparis@...isplace.org, nayna@...ux.ibm.com,
scott.branden@...adcom.com, dan.carpenter@...cle.com,
skhan@...uxfoundation.org, geert@...ux-m68k.org,
tglx@...utronix.de, bauerman@...ux.ibm.com, dhowells@...hat.com,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
kexec@...ts.infradead.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] fs: reduce export usage of kerne_read*() calls
On Mon, May 18, 2020 at 08:21:08AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, May 18, 2020 at 08:37:42AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > Hi Christoph,
> >
> > On Sun, 2020-05-17 at 23:22 -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> > > On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 09:29:33PM +0000, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> > > > On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 11:17:36AM -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> > > > > Can you also move kernel_read_* out of fs.h? That header gets pulled
> > > > > in just about everywhere and doesn't really need function not related
> > > > > to the general fs interface.
> > > >
> > > > Sure, where should I dump these?
> > >
> > > Maybe a new linux/kernel_read_file.h? Bonus points for a small top
> > > of the file comment explaining the point of the interface, which I
> > > still don't get :)
> >
> > Instead of rolling your own method of having the kernel read a file,
> > which requires call specific security hooks, this interface provides a
> > single generic set of pre and post security hooks. The
> > kernel_read_file_id enumeration permits the security hook to
> > differentiate between callers.
> >
> > To comply with secure and trusted boot concepts, a file cannot be
> > accessible to the caller until after it has been measured and/or the
> > integrity (hash/signature) appraised.
> >
> > In some cases, the file was previously read twice, first to measure
> > and/or appraise the file and then read again into a buffer for
> > use. This interface reads the file into a buffer once, calls the
> > generic post security hook, before providing the buffer to the caller.
> > (Note using firmware pre-allocated memory might be an issue.)
> >
> > Partial reading firmware will result in needing to pre-read the entire
> > file, most likely on the security pre hook.
>
> Well described! :)
Since you're moving all this stuff, it woudl be good if you can add this
as part of new kdoc as well.
Luis
Powered by blists - more mailing lists