linux-kernel - [PATCH v4 13/17] IMA: Add support for file reads without contents

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Message-Id: <20200729175845.1745471-14-keescook@chromium.org>
Date:   Wed, 29 Jul 2020 10:58:41 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Scott Branden <scott.branden@...adcom.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
        Takashi Iwai <tiwai@...e.de>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@...nel.org>,
        SeongJae Park <sjpark@...zon.de>,
        KP Singh <kpsingh@...omium.org>, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 13/17] IMA: Add support for file reads without contents

From: Scott Branden <scott.branden@...adcom.com>

When the kernel_read_file LSM hook is called with contents=false, IMA
can appraise the file directly, without requiring a filled buffer. When
such a buffer is available, though, IMA can continue to use it instead
of forcing a double read here.

Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@...adcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200706232309.12010-10-scott.branden@broadcom.com/
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index dc4f90660aa6..de57fce5bced 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -613,11 +613,8 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
 int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
 		  bool contents)
 {
-	/* Reject all partial reads during appraisal. */
-	if (!contents) {
-		if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
-			return -EACCES;
-	}
+	enum ima_hooks func;
+	u32 secid;
 
 	/*
 	 * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
@@ -626,7 +623,20 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
 	 * buffers? It may be desirable to include the buffer address
 	 * in this API and walk all the dma_map_single() mappings to check.
 	 */
-	return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * There will be a call made to ima_post_read_file() with
+	 * a filled buffer, so we don't need to perform an extra
+	 * read early here.
+	 */
+	if (contents)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
+	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+				   0, MAY_READ, func);
 }
 
 const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
-- 
2.25.1