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Message-ID: <20200730164425.GO2655@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2020 18:44:25 +0200
From: peterz@...radead.org
To: "Liang, Kan" <kan.liang@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: mingo@...hat.com, acme@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
ak@...ux.intel.com, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] perf/x86: Reset the counter to prevent the leak for a
RDPMC task
On Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 11:54:35AM -0400, Liang, Kan wrote:
> On 7/30/2020 8:58 AM, peterz@...radead.org wrote:
> > On Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 05:38:15AM -0700, kan.liang@...ux.intel.com wrote:
> > > From: Kan Liang <kan.liang@...ux.intel.com>
> > >
> > > The counter value of a perf task may leak to another RDPMC task.
> >
> > Sure, but nowhere did you explain why that is a problem.
> >
> > > The RDPMC instruction is only available for the X86 platform. Only apply
> > > the fix for the X86 platform.
> >
> > ARM64 can also do it, although I'm not sure what the current state of
> > things is here.
> >
> > > After applying the patch,
> > >
> > > $ taskset -c 0 ./rdpmc_read_all_counters
> > > index 0x0 value 0x0
> > > index 0x1 value 0x0
> > > index 0x2 value 0x0
> > > index 0x3 value 0x0
> > >
> > > index 0x0 value 0x0
> > > index 0x1 value 0x0
> > > index 0x2 value 0x0
> > > index 0x3 value 0x0
> >
> > You forgot about:
> >
> > - telling us why it's a problem,
>
> The non-privileged RDPMC user can get the counter information from other
> perf users. It is a security issue. I will add it in the next version.
You don't know what it counted and you don't know the offset, what can
you do with it?
> > - telling us how badly it affects performance.
>
> I once did performance test on a HSX machine. There is no notable slow down
> with the patch. I will add the performance data in the next version.
It's still up to [4..8]+[3,4] extra WRMSRs per context switch, that's pretty naf.
> > I would feel much better if we only did this on context switches to
> > tasks that have RDPMC enabled.
>
> AFAIK, at least for X86, we can only enable/disable RDPMC globally.
> How can we know if a specific task that have RDPMC enabled/disabled?
It has mm->context.pref_rdpmc_allowed non-zero, go read x86_pmu_event_{,un}mapped().
Without that CR4.PCE is 0 and RDPMC won't work, which is most of the
actual tasks.
Arguably we should have perf_mmap_open() check if 'event->hw.target ==
current', because without that RDPMC is still pointless.
> > So on del() mark the counter dirty (if we don't already have state that
> > implies this), but don't WRMSR. And then on
> > __perf_event_task_sched_in(), _after_ programming the new tasks'
> > counters, check for inactive dirty counters and wipe those -- IFF RDPMC
> > is on for that task.
> >
>
> The generic code doesn't have counters' information. It looks like we need
> to add a new callback to cleanup the dirty counters as below.
>
> In the specific implementation of pmu_cleanup(), we can check and wipe all
> inactive dirty counters.
What about pmu::sched_task(), can't we rejig that a little?
The way I'm reading it now, it's like we iterate the task context for
calling perf_event_context_sched_*(), and then iterate a cpuctx list to
find cpuctx->task_ctx, which would be the exact same contexts we've just
iterated.
So can't we pull the pmu::sched_task() call into
perf_event_context_sched_*() ? That would save a round of
pmu_disable/enable() too afaict.
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