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Message-ID: <80a23580-5067-93b0-53fa-3bd53253c056@sony.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2020 16:29:12 +0200
From: peter enderborg <peter.enderborg@...y.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@...gle.com>
CC: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>,
Joel Fernandes <joelaf@...gle.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@...nel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Rob Herring <robh@...nel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<selinux@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] RFC: selinux avc trace
I did manage to rebase it but this is about my approach.
Compared to Thiébaud Weksteen patch this adds:
1 Filtering. Types goes to trace so we can put up a filter for contexts or type etc.
2 It tries also to cover non denies. And upon that you should be able to do coverage tools.
I think many systems have a lot more rules that what is needed, but there is good way
to find out what. A other way us to make a stat page for the rules, but this way connect to
userspace and can be used for test cases.
This code need a lot more work, but it shows how the filter should work (extra info is not right)
and there are memory leaks, extra debug info and nonsense variable etc.
From: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@...y.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2020 14:44:53 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] RFC: selinux avc trace
This is not done yet. But it shows a trace for selinux avc.
---
include/trace/events/avc.h | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/avc.c | 115 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 205 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/trace/events/avc.h
diff --git a/include/trace/events/avc.h b/include/trace/events/avc.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..28c1044e918b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/trace/events/avc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/*
+ * License terms: GNU General Public License (GPL) version 2
+ *
+ * Author: Peter Enderborg <Peter.Enderborg@...y.com>
+ */
+
+#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
+#define TRACE_SYSTEM avc
+
+#if !defined(_TRACE_AVC_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
+#define _TRACE_AVC_H
+
+#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
+TRACE_EVENT(avc_data,
+ TP_PROTO(u32 requested,
+ u32 denied,
+ u32 audited,
+ int result,
+ const char *msg
+ ),
+
+ TP_ARGS(requested, denied, audited, result,msg),
+
+ TP_STRUCT__entry(
+ __field(u32, requested)
+ __field(u32, denied)
+ __field(u32, audited)
+ __field(int, result)
+ __array(char, msg, 255)
+ ),
+
+ TP_fast_assign(
+ __entry->requested = requested;
+ __entry->denied = denied;
+ __entry->audited = audited;
+ __entry->result = result;
+ memcpy(__entry->msg, msg, 255);
+ ),
+
+ TP_printk("requested=0x%x denied=%d audited=%d result=%d msg=%s",
+ __entry->requested, __entry->denied, __entry->audited, __entry->result, __entry->msg
+ )
+);
+TRACE_EVENT(avc_req,
+ TP_PROTO(u32 requested,
+ u32 denied,
+ u32 audited,
+ int result,
+ const char *msg,
+ u32 ssid,
+ struct selinux_state *state
+ ),
+
+ TP_ARGS(requested, denied, audited, result,msg, ssid, state),
+
+ TP_STRUCT__entry(
+ __field(u32, requested)
+ __field(u32, denied)
+ __field(u32, audited)
+ __field(int, result)
+ __array(char, msg, 255)
+ __field(u32, ssid)
+ __field(struct selinux_state *, state)
+ __field(char*, scontext)
+ __field(u32, ssid_len)
+ __field(u32, ssid_res)
+ ),
+
+ TP_fast_assign(
+ __entry->requested = requested;
+ __entry->denied = denied;
+ __entry->audited = audited;
+ __entry->result = result;
+ memcpy(__entry->msg, msg, 255);
+ __entry->ssid = ssid;
+ __entry->state = state;
+ __entry->ssid_res = security_sid_to_context(
+ state,
+ ssid,
+ &__entry->scontext,
+ &__entry->ssid_len);
+ ),
+
+ TP_printk("requested=0x%x denied=%d audited=%d result=%d msg=%s ssid=%d state=%p scontext=%s slen=%d s=%d",
+ __entry->requested, __entry->denied, __entry->audited, __entry->result, __entry->msg, __entry->ssid, __entry->state,__entry->scontext,__entry->ssid_len, __entry->ssid_res
+ )
+);
+
+#endif /* _TRACE_AVC_H */
+
+/* This part must be outside protection */
+#include <trace/define_trace.h>
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index d18cb32a242a..d8cb9a23d669 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
#include "avc.h"
#include "avc_ss.h"
#include "classmap.h"
+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include <trace/events/avc.h>
#define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS 512
#define AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD 512
@@ -126,6 +128,41 @@ static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
return (ssid ^ (tsid<<2) ^ (tclass<<4)) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
}
+static int avc_dump_avs(char *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
+{
+ const char **perms;
+ int i, perm;
+ int rp;
+
+ if (av == 0) {
+ rp = sprintf(ab, " null");
+ return rp;
+ }
+
+ BUG_ON(!tclass || tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
+ perms = secclass_map[tclass-1].perms;
+
+ rp = sprintf(ab, " {");
+ i = 0;
+ perm = 1;
+ while (i < (sizeof(av) * 8)) {
+ if ((perm & av) && perms[i]) {
+ rp +=sprintf(ab+rp, " %s", perms[i]);
+ av &= ~perm;
+ }
+ i++;
+ perm <<= 1;
+ }
+
+ if (av)
+ rp += sprintf(ab+rp, " 0x%x", av);
+
+ rp +=sprintf(ab+rp, " }");
+ return rp;
+}
+
+
+
/**
* avc_init - Initialize the AVC.
*
@@ -421,8 +458,12 @@ static inline int avc_xperms_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
audited = avc_xperms_audit_required(
requested, avd, xpd, perm, result, &denied);
- if (likely(!audited))
+ if (likely(!audited)) {
+ trace_avc_data(requested, denied, audited, -1,"foo");
return 0;
+ }
+
+ trace_avc_data(requested, denied, audited, -1,"bar");
return slow_avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
audited, denied, result, ad);
}
@@ -541,6 +582,34 @@ static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,
return ret;
}
+static int avc_dump_querys(struct selinux_state *state, char *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+{
+ int rc;
+ char *scontext;
+ u32 scontext_len;
+ int rp;
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(state,ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+ if (rc)
+ rp = sprintf(ab, "ssid=%d", ssid);
+ else {
+ rp = sprintf(ab, "scontext=%s", scontext);
+ kfree(scontext);
+ }
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(state, tsid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+ if (rc)
+ rp +=sprintf(ab+rp, " tsid=%d", tsid);
+ else {
+ rp +=sprintf(ab+rp, " tcontext=%s", scontext);
+ kfree(scontext);
+ }
+
+ BUG_ON(!tclass || tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
+ rp += sprintf(ab+rp, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[tclass-1].name);
+ return rp;
+}
+
/**
* avc_lookup - Look up an AVC entry.
* @ssid: source security identifier
@@ -690,6 +759,7 @@ static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
audit_log_format(ab, " 0x%x", av);
audit_log_format(ab, " } for ");
+
}
/**
@@ -780,6 +850,7 @@ noinline int slow_avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
common_lsm_audit(a, avc_audit_pre_callback, avc_audit_post_callback);
+ pr_info("done lsm");
return 0;
}
@@ -1105,6 +1176,34 @@ int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state,
return rc2;
return rc;
}
+static int avc_dump_extra_info_s(char *ab,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+ int rp;
+
+ if (tsk && tsk->pid) {
+ rp = sprintf(ab, " ppid=%d pcomm=", tsk->parent->pid);
+ rp += sprintf(ab+rp, tsk->parent->comm);
+
+ if (tsk->group_leader->pid != tsk->pid) {
+ rp +=sprintf(ab+rp, " pgid=%d pgcomm=",
+ tsk->group_leader->pid);
+ rp += sprintf(ab+rp,
+ tsk->group_leader->comm);
+ } else if (tsk->parent->group_leader->pid) {
+ rp += sprintf(ab+rp, " pgid=%d pgcomm=",
+ tsk->parent->group_leader->pid);
+ rp += sprintf(ab+rp,
+ tsk->parent->group_leader->comm);
+ }
+ } else {
+ rp = sprintf(ab," no task %p", tsk);
+ }
+ return rp;
+}
+
+
/**
* avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing.
@@ -1178,14 +1277,26 @@ int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
{
struct av_decision avd;
int rc, rc2;
+ char *lb;
+ int x;
+
+ lb = kmalloc(1024, GFP_KERNEL);
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0,
&avd);
rc2 = avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,
auditdata, 0);
- if (rc2)
+ if (rc2) {
+ kfree(lb);
return rc2;
+ }
+
+ x = avc_dump_avs(lb, tclass, 42);
+ x += avc_dump_querys(state, lb+x,ssid, tsid, tclass);
+ if(1) x += avc_dump_extra_info_s(lb+x, auditdata);
+ trace_avc_data(requested, rc, 0, rc2,lb);
+ kfree(lb);
return rc;
}
--
2.17.1
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