linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space

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Message-ID: <CALMp9eSSKra+Vic0U9kDeiT1y+Jfq6Vmrqsw+S8jqD0_oqH9zA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 30 Jul 2020 20:20:06 -0700
From:   Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
To:     Alexander Graf <graf@...zon.com>
Cc:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        KarimAllah Raslan <karahmed@...zon.de>,
        kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space

On Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 4:53 PM Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 4:08 PM Alexander Graf <graf@...zon.com> wrote:
> > Do you have a particular situation in mind where that would not be the
> > case and where we would still want to actually complete an MSR operation
> > after the environment changed?
>
> As far as userspace is concerned, if it has replied with error=0, the
> instruction has completed and retired. If the kernel executes a
> different instruction at CS:RIP, the state is certainly inconsistent
> for WRMSR exits. It would also be inconsistent for RDMSR exits if the
> RDMSR emulation on the userspace side had any side-effects.

Actually, I think there's a potential problem with interrupt delivery
even if the instruction bytes are the same. On the second pass, an
interrupt could be delivered on the CS:IP of a WRMSR, even though
userspace has already emulated the WRMSR instruction. This could be
particularly awkward if the WRMSR was to the x2APIC TPR register, and
in fact lowered the TPR sufficiently to allow a pending interrupt to
be delivered.