linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 3/7] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

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Message-ID: <20200731142905.GA67415@C02TD0UTHF1T.local>
Date:   Fri, 31 Jul 2020 15:29:05 +0100
From:   Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
To:     Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Cc:     Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@....com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
        Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
        Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-nvdimm@...ts.01.org, linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
        x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/7] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create
 "secret" memory areas

On Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 05:22:10PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 27, 2020 at 07:29:31PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:

> > +static int secretmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> > +{
> > +	struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
> > +	unsigned long mode = ctx->mode;
> > +	unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
> > +
> > +	if (!mode)
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +	if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE)) == 0)
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +	if (mlock_future_check(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_flags | VM_LOCKED, len))
> > +		return -EAGAIN;
> > +
> > +	switch (mode) {
> > +	case SECRETMEM_UNCACHED:
> > +		vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
> > +		fallthrough;
> > +	case SECRETMEM_EXCLUSIVE:
> > +		vma->vm_ops = &secretmem_vm_ops;
> > +		break;
> > +	default:
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	vma->vm_flags |= VM_LOCKED;
> > +
> > +	return 0;
> > +}
> 
> I think the uncached mapping is not the right thing for arm/arm64. First
> of all, pgprot_noncached() gives us Strongly Ordered (Device memory)
> semantics together with not allowing unaligned accesses. I suspect the
> semantics are different on x86.

> The second, more serious problem, is that I can't find any place where
> the caches are flushed for the page mapped on fault. When a page is
> allocated, assuming GFP_ZERO, only the caches are guaranteed to be
> zeroed. Exposing this subsequently to user space as uncached would allow
> the user to read stale data prior to zeroing. The arm64
> set_direct_map_default_noflush() doesn't do any cache maintenance.

It's also worth noting that in a virtual machine this is liable to be
either broken (with a potential loss of coherency if the host has a
cacheable alias as existing KVM hosts have), or pointless (if the host
uses S2FWB to upgrade Stage-1 attribues to cacheable as existing KVM
hosts also have).

I think that trying to avoid the data caches creates many more problems
than it solves, and I don't think there's a strong justification for
trying to support that on arm64 to begin with, so I'd rather entirely
opt-out on supporting SECRETMEM_UNCACHED.

Thanks,
Mark.