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Message-Id: <20200803.151038.440269686968773655.davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Mon, 03 Aug 2020 15:10:38 -0700 (PDT)
From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To: yepeilin.cs@...il.com
Cc: pshelar@....org, kuba@...nel.org, dan.carpenter@...cle.com,
arnd@...db.de, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
linux-kernel-mentees@...ts.linuxfoundation.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, dev@...nvswitch.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Linux-kernel-mentees] [PATCH net] openvswitch: Prevent
kernel-infoleak in ovs_ct_put_key()
From: Peilin Ye <yepeilin.cs@...il.com>
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2020 00:48:38 -0400
> ovs_ct_put_key() is potentially copying uninitialized kernel stack memory
> into socket buffers, since the compiler may leave a 3-byte hole at the end
> of `struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv4` and `struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv6`. Fix
> it by initializing `orig` with memset().
>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Please don't CC: stable for networking fixes.
> Fixes: 9dd7f8907c37 ("openvswitch: Add original direction conntrack tuple to sw_flow_key.")
> Suggested-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin.cs@...il.com>
Applied and queued up for -stable, thank you.
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