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Message-ID: <20200805125707.GC35926@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2020 14:57:07 +0200
From: peterz@...radead.org
To: "Jin, Yao" <yao.jin@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: mingo@...hat.com, oleg@...hat.com, acme@...nel.org,
jolsa@...nel.org, Linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, ak@...ux.intel.com,
kan.liang@...el.com, yao.jin@...el.com,
alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com, mark.rutland@....com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] perf/core: Fake regs for leaked kernel samples
On Wed, Aug 05, 2020 at 02:44:54PM +0200, peterz@...radead.org wrote:
> How's this?
Clearly I didn't even hold it near a compiler...
> ---
> kernel/events/core.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> index 7c436d705fbd..3e4e328b521a 100644
> --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> @@ -6988,23 +6988,49 @@ perf_callchain(struct perf_event *event, struct pt_regs *regs)
> return callchain ?: &__empty_callchain;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Due to interrupt latency (skid), we may enter the kernel before taking the
> + * PMI, even if the PMU is configured to only count user events. To avoid
> + * leaking kernel addresses, use task_pt_regs(), when available.
> + */
> +static struct pt_regs *sanitize_sample_regs(struct perf_event *event, struct pt_regs *regs)
> +{
> + struct pt_regs *sample_regs = regs;
> +
> + /* user only */
> + if (!event->attr.exclude_kernel || !event->attr.exclude_hv ||
> + !event->attr.exclude_host || !event->attr.exclude_guest)
> + return sample_regs;
> +
> + if (sample_regs(regs))
> + return sample_regs;
That wants to he:
if (user_regs(regs))
return sample_regs;
> +
> + if (!(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
s/{//
> + sample_regs = task_pt_regs(current);
> + else
> + instruction_pointer_set(regs, -1L);
> +
> + return sample_regs;
> +}
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