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Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2020 17:02:20 -0700 From: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@...cle.com> To: Cfir Cohen <cfir@...gle.com>, "kvm @ vger . kernel . org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, Lendacky Thomas <thomas.lendacky@....com>, Singh Brijesh <brijesh.singh@....com> Cc: Grimm Jon <Jon.Grimm@....com>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>, Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>, Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>, Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: SVM: Mark SEV launch secret pages as dirty. On 8/6/20 6:23 PM, Cfir Cohen wrote: > The LAUNCH_SECRET command performs encryption of the > launch secret memory contents. Mark pinned pages as > dirty, before unpinning them. > This matches the logic in sev_launch_update(). sev_launch_update_data() instead of sev_launch_update() ? > > Signed-off-by: Cfir Cohen <cfir@...gle.com> > --- > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- > 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > index 5573a97f1520..37c47d26b9f7 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params; > struct page **pages; > void *blob, *hdr; > - unsigned long n; > + unsigned long n, i; > int ret, offset; > > if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > @@ -863,6 +863,14 @@ static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > if (!pages) > return -ENOMEM; > > + /* > + * The LAUNCH_SECRET command will perform in-place encryption of the > + * memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region with C=1). > + * It's possible that the cache may contain the data with C=0, i.e., > + * unencrypted so invalidate it first. > + */ > + sev_clflush_pages(pages, n); > + > /* > * The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify > * that userspace memory pages are contiguous before we issue command. > @@ -908,6 +916,11 @@ static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > e_free: > kfree(data); > e_unpin_memory: > + /* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */ > + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { > + set_page_dirty_lock(pages[i]); > + mark_page_accessed(pages[i]); > + } > sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n); > return ret; > } Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@...cle.com>
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